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ABSTRACT 
The increased prevalence of whistleblowing in sport has precipitated the need to 
understand the antecedent conditions that underpin whistleblowing intentions. The act of 
whistleblowing centers on reporting an illegal (or unethical) act by an observer who 
possesses inside information of the wrongdoing. Sport offers a unique lens through 
which to study whistleblowing since the context does not follow traditional models of 
the practice, particularly regarding the antecedent conditions. Employing qualitative 
methods grounded in the Theory of Planned Behavior, Cognitive Dissonance Theory, 
Attribution Theory, Organizational Commitment on Prosocial Behavior, and Cognitive 
Moral Development theoretical frameworks, the ideas that whistleblowing antecedent 
conditions in sport are self-serving and based on non-altruistic intentions were evaluated. 
As well, by applying benefit-to-cost differential and affiliation models, this research 
bridged the gap in the literature by initially revealing the complexities of whistleblowing 
among a sample of collegiate sport executives. Moreover, the qualitative measures aided 
in developing testable hypotheses on the relationship between antecedent conditions 
(e.g., altruism, prosocial behavior, revenge, competitive advantage, and personal 
advancement) and whistleblowing intentions while also providing potential barriers that 
impede the whistleblowing process. Sport-specific theory on ethical decision-making 
was strengthened contributing to a better understanding of the whistleblowing in sport.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The impact of ethical wrongdoing in our society, and its subsequent 
ramifications, has pervaded multiple segments of everyday life (Near & Miceli, 1995). 
As evidenced by Edward Snowden leaking classified National Security Agency (NSA) 
documents, to General Motors falsifying safety information, to the Penn State University 
sexual assault scandal, organizational wrongdoings have permeated sport, general 
business, and governmental organizations. The dissemination of these wrongdoings is 
done through a form of whistleblowing, or “… the disclosure by organization members 
(former and current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of 
their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to affect action” (Near & 
Miceli, 1985, 525). The emphasis of motivations for whistleblowing is typically limited 
to the whistleblower trying to right an ethical wrongdoing. However, blowing the 
whistle may also be an individual’s attempt to see change in policy or practice within an 
organization (Near & Jensen, 1983).  
The prevalence of whistleblowing can be seen in organizations worldwide as 
decriers of big business have become more aware of unethical behavior and general 
wrongdoing within their organizations (Richardson & McGlynn, 2011). The increase in 
social awareness of ethical wrongdoings or illegal actions has risen considerably since 
the 1970s, when (at that time) there was fear that the cost of disseminating negative 
information outweighed any ethical consideration of righting a wrong (Keil, Tiwana, & 
Sneha, 2010). In the 1980s, however, whistleblowing as a prosocial practice became 
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more accepted since statutes began appearing that protected the whistler-blower from 
litigious recourse (Keil et al., 2010). Still, the antecedent conditions of whistleblowing 
are impacted by numerous barriers, concerns, and associated risks to the whistleblower, 
which can collectively minimize or greatly enhance the likelihood of a whistleblowing 
intention (Near & Miceli, 1995). 
Overview of the Problem 
Near and Miceli (1995) elucidated the ethical concerns and social stigmas 
surrounding whistleblowing, which centered on power, credibility, retaliation, 
organizational climate, and anonymity. Keil, Tiwana, and Sneha (2010) explained the 
“mum-effect,” or the reluctance to disseminate bad news, while Seifert (2006) couched 
whistleblowing in the idea of perceived social justice. Key constructs of whistleblowing, 
in a business management setting, are well defined and somewhat consistent among 
researchers. However, the body of research on whistleblowing may not truly predict 
intention beyond the motive of prosocial behavior. Past whistleblowing research has not 
able to adequately extend beyond description to explanation of the antecedents that lead 
to one’s intention to blow the whistle. Additionally, few studies have offered empirical 
evidence to support the various antecedent conditions of the whistleblowing process 
proposed by researchers. Moreover, and despite the prevalence of whistleblowing in this 
context, even fewer studies have examined the construct and its potential impacts in the 
sport industry.  
Sport has seen an increase in high-profile whistleblowing cases over the last 
fifteen years. Incidence in sport corruption has seen a rise in match fixing, bribery, 
 3 
 
 
corruption, doping, performance-enhancing drugs, discrimination, academic fraud, 
sexual abuse, physical abuse, and misuse of trade secrets. Further, it is not just the 
athletes and professional organizations that these unethical and illegal behavior effects. 
Fans and associated organizational partners (e.g., corporate sponsors, media) expect 
purity and fairness within sport. These unethical actions defraud these external 
stakeholders of time and money. Despite sport offering unique and relevant cases from 
which to study whistleblowing, there are only a handful of research articles using sport 
as the context for whistleblowing behavior. To the researcher’s knowledge, this 
dissertation is the first attempt at creating a sport-centric whistleblowing model to 
understand the antecedents and moderating variables (i.e., benefit-to-cost differentials) 
towards whistleblowing intention, while also providing a retrospective content analysis 
on sport whistleblowing cases over the last fifteen years. Thus, an investigation into the 
antecedents, benefit-to-cost differential, and outcomes associated with whistleblowing in 
sport are necessary. 
Content Analysis 
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) describe a summative content analysis as, “... a study 
design that starts with identifying and quantifying certain words or content in text with 
the purpose of understanding the contextual use of the words or content” (p. 1283). The 
purpose of the summative approach is to explore content using identifying keywords 
before and during data analysis stemming from the interest of researchers or review of 
literature (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999).  
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As such, secondary literature was used to perform a content analysis from select 
whistleblowing cases in the sport industry. Babbie (2004) deemed the study of recorded 
human communications, “… among the forms suitable for study are books, magazines, 
web pages, poems, newspapers, letters, email messages, bulletin board postings on the 
Internet, laws and constitutions, as well as any components or collection thereof” (p. 
314) to be the primary elements of a content analysis. The researchers looked for 
underlining meanings of the text (Babbie, 2004).  
The summative content analysis was conducted by coding text into categories. 
Two researchers independently coded the data. The lead researcher was familiar to the 
research topic and represented an insider assessment. A second researcher who was less 
familiar with the research topic offered an outsider assessment. Then using a conceptual 
analysis technique the categories were examined. Sport whistleblowing cases spanning 
the last fifteen years were analyzed conceptually to determine the potential antecedent 
conditions for whistleblowing intention (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Whistleblowing in Sport Content Analysis (select cases) 
Year Whistleblower Organization Situational 
Characteristic(s) 
Action 
2003 Trevor Graham BALCO 
Personal 
Advancement 
Graham, a former USA track and 
field coach, anonymously phoned the 
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency making 
them aware of undetectable anabolic 
steroids being distributed to world-
class athletes. He then sent in a used 
syringe containing residue of the 
PED to authorities. This led to a 
federal investigation of Victor Conte 
and BALCO, which had been 
distributing steroids from 1988-2002 
in one of the largest steroid scandals 
ever reported. Graham stated that he 
was not a part of the distribution of 
PEDs but was later sent to prison for 
perjury. It was later stated that 
Graham wanted to be known as the 
"mastermind of chemistry" in 
providing illegal drugs to athletes. 
2003 Abar Rouse Dave Bliss 
& 
Baylor 
University 
Prosocial Behavior 
Rouse, a men's basketball assistant 
coach, secretly audio recorded then 
head coach Dave Bliss’s attempt to 
cover-up an investigation into the 
payments of tuition of slain student-
athlete, Patrick Dennehy. Bliss, who 
violated NCAA bylaws and paid for 
the student athlete's tuition, instructed 
his assistant coaches and players to 
lie to investigators. He also 
threatened to fire Rouse if he did not 
comply with his directives. Rouse 
was effectively blackballed from 
collegiate coaching for his actions. 
Bliss resigned as head coach and was 
given a 10-year "show-cause" penalty 
by the NCAA. 
2005 Jose Canseco Major League 
Baseball 
Revenge; 
Personal 
Advancement 
Canseco, a former major league 
baseball player, was widely 
considered the face of the "steroid 
era" and was an outcast amongst the 
baseball community. In 2005 
Canseco wrote a book, 'Juiced,' in 
which he claimed that 85% of MLB 
players used anabolic steroids. 
Canseco also named multiple players 
with many denying the allegations. 
MLB commissioned the 'Mitchell 
Report' aimed at uncovering any 
player who used steroids. The report 
justified many of Canseco's claims. 
He subsequently wrote another book, 
'Vindicated,' following the report. 
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Table 1: Continued 
Year Whistleblower Organization Situational 
Characteristic(s) 
Action 
2006 James Gundlach Auburn 
University 
Altruism 
Gundlach was an Auburn University 
sociology professor who internally 
reported his suspicions of academic 
fraud violations within his 
department. He later externally 
whistleblew to the New York Times 
alleging that the athletic department 
was skirting National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) 
requirements for their student 
athletes. He claimed to have done so 
for altruistic reasons. Gundlach 
retired from his professor position a 
few years after the scandal. 
2006 Lloyd Lake 
Reggie Bush 
& 
University of 
Southern 
California 
Revenge 
Sports agent Lloyd Lake sued Bush 
and his family for not repaying 
roughly $300,000 in gifts after Bush 
declined to hire Lake as his agent 
once turning professional. Lake in 
effect blew the whistle on the 
improprieties to the NCAA. Bush 
was later stripped of his Heisman 
Trophy and USC was put on four 
years’ probation. 
2007 Eric Mangini 
Bill Belichek 
& 
New England 
Patriots 
Competitive 
Advantage 
New York Jets head coach Eric 
Mangini, a former assistant coach, 
had inside knowledge that the 
Patriots were illegally filming 
coaches signals from their own 
sideline, which is against NFL rules. 
Mangini was a participant in this 
rules violation while under the 
Patriots employment but quickly sent 
notice to the league when he was no 
longer affiliated. Dubbed 'Spy-gate', 
the league fined Belichek $500,000, 
the Patriots $250,000, and stripped 
them of a first round draft pick. 
2007 Ron Wilson Teemu Selanne Competitive 
Advantage 
Wilson, a former coach of Selanne, 
knew that Selanne regularly used 
illegal sticks to enhance his 
performance. Selanee claims that he 
gave Wilson a stick as a gift year’s 
prior. Wilson reported the violation 
to the league office during a playoff 
round where his team was facing 
Selanne's. Selanne was forced to use 
a regulation stick. 
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Table 1: Continued 
Year Whistleblower Organization Situational 
Characteristic(s)	   Action 
2010 Floyd Landis Lance 
Armstrong 
Revenge 
Landis, a former teammate of 
Armstrong, blew the whistle on 
Armstrong after he himself was 
caught blood doping. Landis 
admitted that he had doped at the 
behest of Armstrong and was angered 
that Armstrong was not being honest. 
Armstrong maintained that Landis 
only blew the whistle because his 
contract was not renewed. Armstrong 
would later admit to the allegations 
and was stripped of his seven Tour de 
France victories and order to pay 
millions in restitution.  
2010 Mississippi State 
University 
boosters 
Cam Newton & 
Auburn 
University 
Competitive 
Advantage; 
Revenge 
Newton, a college quarterback, was 
coming off a junior college 
championship and looking to transfer 
to an D1 - FBS school. Mississippi 
State booster, Kenny Rogers, went on 
a Dallas radio station and alleged that 
Newton's father was selling his son's 
services to the highest bidder. 
Newton was suspended amid an 
investigation that his father solicited 
roughly $180,000 violating NCAA 
bylaws. The case eventually was 
closed without enough evidence to 
substantiate the claims. 
2010 
- 
2012 
Anonymous 
& 
Sean Pamphilon 
New Orleans 
Saints 
Revenge; 
Personal 
Advancement 
In 2009 there was an anonymous 
report from an NFL player that the 
New Orleans Saints were giving 
bonuses to their own players who 
intentionally intended to injure 
opposing players. An investigation 
ensued and enough evidence was 
found to confirm the report. 
However, the Saints remained 
adamant that there was no 
wrongdoing. Pamphilon, a 
documentary filmmaker, released 
audio to Yahoo Sports of assistant 
coach Gregg Williams instructing his 
players to hurt the opponents. Among 
other sanctions, the Saints were 
fined, head coach Sean Payton was 
suspended for the season, General 
Manager Mickey Loomis was 
suspended for 8 games, and Williams 
was banned from the NFL. 
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Table 1: Continued 
Year Whistleblower Organization Situational 
Characteristic(s)	   Action 
2010 
- 
2014 
Bonita Mersiades 
& 
Phaedra Almajid 
FIFA 
& 
Australia 
& 
Qatar 
Prosocial Behavior 
Mersiades, part of the 2018 
Australian World Cup bid, and 
Almajid, part of the 2022 Qatar  
World Cup bid both blew the whistle 
on corrupt and unethical behaviors 
they had inside knowledge of during 
the bidding process. Both women 
were shamed publically and 
threatened for their leaks of internal 
information. Almajid was threatened 
legally unless she retracted her 
statements publicly, which she later 
did. This case is ongoing.  
2012 
Aaron Fisher 
& 
Mike McQueary 
Jerry Sandusky 
& 
Penn State 
University 
Prosocial Behavior; 
Personal 
Advancement 
Fisher, also known as victim 1, 
reported sexual assault and rape 
charges against former PSU football 
coach Jerry Sandusky. McQueary, an 
assistant PSU football coach further 
testified that he was witness to 
Sandusky molesting children and 
reported the behavior to officials 
within PSU. Sandusky was sentenced 
to life in prison while the 
administrators, athletic department 
officials, and head coach Joe Paterno 
were either fired or stepped down 
from their positions. 
2013 Christopher 
Cerbone 
Catholic Diocese 
of Sacramento 
Prosocial Behavior 
Cerbone, a high school football 
coach, learned of alleged sexual 
hazing amongst some of his players. 
He reported the misconduct to the 
school principle and was fired a few 
weeks later after an investigation. A 
court ruled in his favor and the 
diocese reached a settlement with 
Cerbone for $4mm. 
2013 Porter Fischer Biogenesis of 
America 
Revenge; 
Personal 
Advancement 
Fischer, a former marketing director 
for Biogenesis of America, leaked 
documents to MLB detailing specific 
players receiving performance-
enhancing drugs. In an attempt to 
start a federal investigation, Fischer 
also leaked the documents to Miami 
New Times reporters. He did so over 
because of claims that owner 
Anthony Bosch owed him $4,000. 
For his help in the investigation 
Fischer received $5,500 from MLB. 
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Table 1: Continued 
Year Whistleblower Organization Situational 
Characteristic(s)	   Action 
2014 Anthony Gearon 
Jr. 
Atlanta Hawks Personal 
Advancement 
Gearon Jr., a minority owner of the 
Atlanta Hawks, leaked a phone-
recorded conversation of his General 
Manager making racially insensitive 
remarks. He also provided a 2012 
email from majority owner, Bruce 
Levenson, to Yahoo Sports detailing 
racially charged comments on fan 
attendance. Results of the leak 
resulted in the Hawks being put up 
for sale. 
2014 Mary Willingham University of 
North Carolina 
Prosocial Behavior 
Willingham, a learning specialist, 
reported academic fraud allegations 
amongst student athletes that had 
been ongoing from roughly 1993 to 
2011. Willingham resigned from her 
position due to her feeling punished 
for revealing the fraud. She 
eventually would sue UNC asking for 
her job back but agreed on a 
settlement of $335,000 (roughly three 
years’ salary plus legal fees). The 
NCAA is still conducting an 
investigation of UNC. 
2015 Ryan Grigson 
Bill Belichek 
& 
New England 
Patriots 
Competitive 
Advantage 
Grigson, the General Manager of the 
Indianapolis Colts, blew the whistle 
on the Patriots prior, during, and after 
a 2015 playoff game alleging that the 
footballs being used by the Patriots 
were under-inflated offering the team 
a competitive edge. The investigation 
is ongoing. 
2015 Chris Janes 
Jackie Robinson 
West Little 
League Team 
Prosocial Behavior 
Janes blew the whistle on a little 
league team from Chicago because of 
"blatant cheating." It was found that 
the little league players were not 
from the zoned residence area in 
which the team is based and were 
recruited as local "ringers." The team 
was subsequently stripped of their 
championship and placed on 
probation. 
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Purpose of Study 
Influenced by the lack of research on whistleblowing in sport, the purpose of this 
dissertation is to develop a unified model for whistleblowing intention in sport with 
particular attention focused on antecedent conditions (e.g., motives), benefit-to-cost 
differential, affiliation, severity of rules violations and ethical wrongdoing, and moral 
and ethical considerations. The main thesis is that the antecedent conditions (e.g., 
altruism, prosocial behavior, revenge, competitive advantage, and personal 
advancement) for whistleblowing in sport are somewhat different from mainstream 
business, thereby warranting further investigation into this unique context. The outcome 
of this research should enhance sport management scholar’s theoretical and practical 
considerations of the phenomenon. The following overarching research questions were 
developed to guide this investigation: 
1. What is the perception of whistleblowing in sport?
2. What are the antecedents conditions that influence whistleblowing intention
in sport?
3. What are potential benefit-to-cost differential considerations that influence
whistleblowing intention?
4. How does one’s affiliation with an organization influence intention to
whistleblow?
Research Paradigm 
Aristotle claimed the mark of an educated mind is to be able to entertain a 
thought without accepting it. This idea aligns with Mintzberg (2005):  
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So we need all kinds of theories – the more, the better. As researchers, 
scholars, and teachers, our obligation is to stimulate thinking, and a 
good way to do that is to offer alternate theories – multiple 
explanations of the same phenomena. Our students and readers should 
leave our classrooms and publications pondering, wondering, thinking 
– not knowing (p. 356).
The researcher’s aim was to help aid in explaining a measure of truth for the phenomena 
of whistleblowing and assist in the subsequent transformability of that knowledge to the 
aggregate (i.e., other scholars, students, etc.). The only way we are better able to 
understand the world around us to is answer the “so what” questions in research. In order 
to accomplish this, researchers need to borrow and adapt from existing theory in order to 
extend or create new theory.  
Lincoln and Guba (1985) posit that we refer to “… a systematic set of beliefs, 
together with their accompanying methods, as a paradigm” (p. 15). It is important for the 
researcher to acknowledge a chosen paradigm(s) within their study. Accordingly, the 
studies contained in this dissertation were framed using the interpretivist (e.g., 
constructivist) paradigm (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), postpositivist paradigm (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994), and critical theory paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) to assist in 
acknowledging researcher bias, worldview, and assumptions. Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
suggest that while it may be impossible to do so, researchers should try and explain as 
many potential biases as possible. Not everyone follows the dogma of one particular 
paradigm on an everyday basis. A multiple paradigm approach, while unconventional, 
explains more researcher biases, and subsequently, can allow for multiple validity 
checks. However, the researcher most closely aligns and writes mainly from the 
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interpretivist (e.g., constructivist) paradigm based on the nature of a multiple-case study 
approach.  
It is important for the researcher to acknowledge any biases that may have 
influenced their research paradigm. Sport fandom involves high levels of emotional and 
affective attachment (Goldsmith & Walker, 2014; Lock & Filo, 2012; Zagacki & Grano, 
2005). As such, a sport fan that is also a scholar may find it difficult to separate their 
fandom from their research, especially when the topic (e.g., cheating scandals, 
performance enhancing drug use) is something to which they feel a visceral reaction. 
Scholars are taught to study and research in a cognate area that they find interesting at 
the earliest level of their doctorate training (Charmaz, 1994). If they become engaged in 
a particular research theory and context it should then make for a sustainable line of 
research, which in turn should help add valuable information to the aggregate of the 
sport management field.   
This researcher became aware of whistleblowing when the ‘Penn State scandal’ 
hit Happy Valley in State College, Pennsylvania in November 2011. As a native 
Pennsylvanian whose Mother attended Penn State University, the scandal was of 
tremendous interest. Once the scandal was made public it was hard to not form a 
negative opinion and bias towards the university for how they handled the allegations, 
subsequent cover-up, and media.  
This researcher also partook in many conversations and debates with proud Penn 
State alumni who argued that authorities handled the situation properly and that the 
actors (e.g., Jerry Sandusky, Joe Paterno, and PSU officials) in the case were being made 
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scapegoats. It was difficult to rationalize their views on the situation as it went counter to 
the researcher’s own. This researcher, more than once, tried to put himself in the 
whistleblower’s state of mind in an attempt to figure out why there was no follow up 
report of the alleged crimes to the proper authorities. This researcher then weighed his 
personal morals and ethics and imagined the cost-benefit analysis that the whistleblower 
must have performed to determine his whistleblowing intention.  
This particular case arguably had more to do with state and federal law than most 
whistleblowing cases that are seen at the professional or collegiate levels. However, the 
case did allow for this researcher to experience a range of emotions, form potential 
biases, understand how multiple people can experience the same situation from various, 
conflicting viewpoints, and how long established social norms (e.g., social class, race) 
can influence the handling of even the most heinous crimes.  
The prevalence of whistleblowing in sport has seen a discernible increase over 
the last few years. It should be noted that the researcher’s interests in moral and ethical 
scenarios as they relate to decision-making informs his research. Due to these interests 
and the bevy of cases that are being reported it should come as no shock that the 
researcher chose to investigate whistleblowing in sport as his cognate area.  
Epistemological Paradigm 
Due to the uniqueness of whistleblowing it would be shortsighted and dishonest 
to not acknowledge the many potential biases of the researcher. Unless the researcher is 
going through a whistleblowing scenario and journaling the experience it is unlikely that 
all of the emotions and experiences are going to be relayed with accuracy. It is 
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particularly salient to note that even asking potential whistleblowers to predict future 
actions (hypothetical versus actual) has limitations in that people aspire to be ethical 
without allowing for or ignoring social and institutional constraints. Therefore, the 
researcher must use law reviews, literature, and second-hand accounts of whistleblowing 
cases to adequately explain the experiences. The approach of using multiple 
epistemological lenses minimizes the systematic beliefs of the researcher lending 
credibility to the study. However, the interpretivist paradigm is the primary paradigm 
used to frame the study. 
By using the interpretivist (e.g., constructivist) paradigm, the researcher allows 
for respondents to see the same thing differently, which in turn, explains multiple 
realities. These realities are socially constructed through human interaction and are 
based solely on the individual’s perspective. Baxter and Jack (2004) stated, “... 
constructivists claim that truth is relative and that it is dependent on one’s perspective” 
(p. 545). As whistleblowing behavior ranges from self-serving to prosocial behavior to 
altruism, it is important to recognize that each potential whistleblower, if put in identical 
scenarios, may view and act on that scenario differently.  
The postpositivist paradigm, or “… modernist phase”, allows for reality to be 
quantified, measured, and categorized (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 8). Effectively, 
researchers can measure reality with the proper methods, procedures, theories, and facts, 
which in turn, confirm hypotheses. The act of whistleblowing extends beyond grounded 
theory as it involves scripted processes carried out by the whistleblower and is supported 
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by United States legal statutes that protect whistleblowers from retaliatory actions. This 
allows for hypotheses to be tested through existing case law for effectiveness.   
The critical theory paradigm also recognizes multiple realities but maintains that 
dominant (e.g., white, protestant, and male) constructions promote inequities. This is 
particularly salient in whistleblowing as much of the whistleblowing literature has 
examined the subject from a business-centric or legal perspective where dominant 
constructions hold the power over those who are marginalized leading to a lesser 
likelihood of reporting of immoral, unethical, and illegal wrongdoings. It is through 
these paradigm assumptions, and the lens of the researcher, respondents, and 
reviewers/readers that validity can be checked and the findings be deemed credible. 
Design 
The most accurate way to understand the antecedent conditions to 
whistleblowing is through a mixed-method design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; 
Vadera, Aguilera, & Caza 2009), since such designs help improve casual inferences 
(Rudd & Johnson, 2010). Mixed-methods are superior to cross-sectional, self-reported 
surveys or scenario-based studies, since they make it difficult to truly examine the 
antecedent conditions of whistleblowing because the antecedent conditions may change 
before, during, and after the act is carried out. Miceli and Near (1984; 1989) used cross-
sectional, self-reported data but were not able to truly predict intention. A weakness in 
the literature on the whistleblowing process is that many of the assumptions have yet to 
be empirically tested (Richardson & McGlynn, 2011).  
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Despite these validity concerns, the conceptual model will be tested using 
qualitative and quantitative measures. In Study 1 (Chapter III), interviews with collegiate 
executives were performed to establish possible antecedent conditions, or motives, to 
whistleblow. Additionally, the interviews explored the levels of severity of possible 
violations and how the reporting of those violations is handled both internally and 
externally to set up future studies. Lastly, interviews probed how ethical and moral 
character relates to whistleblowing. A subsequent quantitative approach will be used to 
test the antecedent conditions found in the qualitative study but will not be included in 
this dissertation. 
Dissertation Format 
 This dissertation is composed in a journal article format and is organized in the 
following manner. This current section (Chapter I) serves as an overarching introduction 
to research inquiry. The conceptual article (Chapter II) provides an extended literature 
review on whistleblowing, theoretical frameworks on behavioral intention, and 
antecedent conditions to whistleblowing (e.g., motives). In Chapter III, the researcher 
conducted a qualitative inquiry into possible whistleblowing antecedent conditions, 
potential benefit-to-cost differential considerations, the role of affiliation, and how 
negative antecedent conditions influence reporting practice, all within a sport context. 
Chapters II and III are self-contained chapters, which will be completed journal articles. 
In Chapter IV, the researcher provided an aggregate of the two studies highlighting their 
contributions made within sport management literature, practical implications of the 
research, and offered a future research agenda. 
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CHAPTER II 
WHISTLEBLOWING IN SPORT: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Introduction 
 Concerns over ethical wrongdoings carry potentially heavy implications for 
social interactions and the attributions that workers and employees assign to businesses 
(Near & Miceli, 1995). In particular, the recent spate of whistleblowing has provided 
ammunition to critics characterizing big business as morally corrupt (Gundlach, 
Martinko, & Douglas, 2008; Richardson & McGlynn, 2011). The litany of ethical 
wrongdoings has been witnessed across both high and low profile businesses (Mesner-
Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Transposing this discussion to sport, many organizations 
are equally as culpable in perpetuating society’s stigmas. For example, cheating 
scandals, academic fraud, performance enhancing drug use, improper benefits, physical 
and mental abuse by coaches on athletes, organizational cover-ups, and a lack of 
institutional control are some malfeasances witnessed in sport. 
Over the past thirty years, ethical issues have propagated a marked increase in 
both awareness and reporting of moral, ethical, and illegal wrongdoings. Prior to this 
time, Keil, Tiwana, and Sneha (2010) noted that society possessed a fear that the costs of 
disseminating pejorative information outweighed the cost of righting a wrong – 
appropriately termed, “the mum effect” (p. 193). Later, whistleblowing became more 
accepted since legal statutes to protect whistleblowers began appearing (Keil et al., 
2010). Despite this, whistleblowing still carries negative social consequences (Near & 
Miceli, 1995) such as humiliation, assassination of character, formation of “anti-you” 
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group, and loss of job (Ahern & McDonald, 2002; Brodie, 1998; Fletcher et al., 1998; 
Wilmot, 2000). Additionally,  those who are on the receiving end of the whistleblowing 
act often try to delegitimize the claims based on negative social connotations and 
questioning of the whistleblower’s antecedent conditions (Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 
2009).  
 Prior literature has focused largely on whistleblowing predictors from a prosocial 
(Brief & Motowildo, 1986; Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Hersh, 2002; Near, 1989; Staub, 
1978; Tevino, 1986) and altruistic (Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Leeds, 1963) perspective. 
For example, Dozier and Miceli (1985) theorized that whistleblowing should increase if 
the action will make a positive difference for an organization or society at large. 
However, much of the informing general management and psychology whistleblowing 
literature centers on the below summary: 
1. Whistleblowing process (Kaptein, 2011; Miceli & Near, 1984; Near & 
Jensen, 1983; Near & Miceli, 1985, 1996; Street, 2011) 
2. Effectiveness of statutes (Dworkin & Near, 1987; Near & Dworkin, 1998; 
Near & Miceli, 1995) 
3. Financial gain (Bowles & Poliana-Reyes, 2012; Callahan & Dworkin, 1992; 
Carson, Verdu, & Wakutch, 2007; Miceli & Near, 1994; Miceli, Near, & 
Schwenk, 1991)  
4. Ethical beliefs (Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Chiu, 2003; Greenberger, Miceli, & 
Cohen, 1987; Jensen, 1987; Miceli & Near, 1998; Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 
2008; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007; Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, & Thorton, 
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2010; Sims & Keenan, 1998; Starkey, 1998; Trevino & Victor, 1992; Zhang, 
Chiu, & Wei, 2009) 
5. Wrongdoing (King, 1997; Lee, Heilman, & Near, 2004; Near, Rehg, Van 
Scotter, & Miceli, 2004) 
6. Organizational justice and misconduct (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 
2005; Miceli, Near, Rehg, & Van Scotter, 2012; Miethe & Rothschild, 1994; 
Seifert, 2006; Seifert, Sweeney, Joireman, & Thorton, 2010) 
7. Retaliation (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 
2003; Gundlach, Martinko, & Douglas, 2008; Mesmer-Magnus & 
Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli & Near, 1989, 1992; Miceli, Near, Rehg, & Van 
Scotter, 2012; Miceli, Rehg, Near, & Ryan, 1999; Near & Miceli, 1986; 
Rehg, Miceli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2008) 
8. Loyalty (Duska, 2007; Larmer, 1992) 
Whistleblowing 
Defined as “… the disclosure by organization members (former and current) of 
illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons 
or organizations that may be able to affect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 525), 
whistleblowing is a deliberate non-obligatory act done by a person who has (or had) 
privileged access to data or information (Jubb, 1999). In the aggregate, the act of 
whistleblowing is viewed in terms of the actor and the conditions for the act. From the 
actor standpoint, Near and Miceli (1996) put forth the idea that three social actors are 
required for organizational whistleblowing to occur: (1) the wrongdoer(s), who commit 
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the alleged wrongdoing, (2) the whistleblower(s), who observe the wrongdoing, define it 
as such and report it, and (3) the recipient(s), of the report of wrongdoing. From the 
conditional standpoint, Judd (1999) maintained that six elements are involved in any 
whistleblowing case: (1) action, a disclosure, (2) outcome, on public record, (3) actor, 
person who has access to the data or information, (4) subject, about legality or 
wrongdoing, (5) target, which implicates the organization, and (6) recipient, the external 
entity.  
 Whistleblowing has traditionally been examined from a policy and legal 
approach with little consistency among cases (Near & Miceli, 1985). The lack of 
consistency has as much to do with the vagueness of whistleblowing phenomena as it 
does with each whistleblowing case being unique (Near & Jensen, 1983). The 
uniqueness of whistleblowing makes it difficult for researchers to generalize the 
whistleblowing process (Near & Jenson, 1983). Even with organizations trying to 
strategically plan to prevent wrongdoing to minimize financial, legal, and perceptual 
damage in the court of public opinion, it is nearly impossible to safeguard against 
employee and employer ethical wrongdoing (Kaptein, 2011). Also, a decision whether or 
not to blow the whistle can be socially influenced (Gundlach et al., 2003).  
 The whistleblowing process is hard to predict and lacks sound, consistent theory 
(Near & Miceli, 1985). The elements of the whistleblowing process, however, are 
somewhat consistent. For example, Near and Miceli (1985) theorized that the 
whistleblower must have been either a current or former member of the organization 
who does not have the power to right the wrongdoing. The whistleblower can choose to 
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be either anonymous or not and choose whether or not to blow the whistle, none of 
which should alter whistleblowing effectiveness.  
 Near and Miceli (1995) defined the effectiveness of whistleblowing as, “… as the 
extent to which the questionable or wrongful practice (or omission) is terminated at least 
partly because of whistleblowing and within a reasonable time frame” (p. 681). Based on 
change theory and power theory, individual predictor variables of the characteristics of 
the whistleblower (e.g., credibility, power, anonymity), characteristics of the complaint 
recipient (e.g., credibility, power), and characteristics of the wrongdoer (e.g., credibility, 
power) lead directly to the outcome variable of the organization’s willingness to change 
and lead to the termination of the wrongdoing (Miceli & Near, 1995). 
 Near and Miceli (1985) posited that there are four decisions made by the 
whistleblower when determining whether or not to blow the whistle. The first decision is 
to decide whether the act is illegal, immoral, or unethical (decision #1). The level of 
severity is a factor that plays a situational role in this decision. If the whistleblower 
decides to act and report (decision #2) then the organization has to make a decision on 
how to handle the news (decision #3). The organization has to investigate and determine 
the level of severity and if the claim has substance (Near & Jensen, 1983). The 
organization could decide to enact change and right the wrongdoing, ignore the claim, or 
decide something in between (decision #4).  
 In addition to the level of severity, the type of wrongdoing is significantly related 
to whether or not an actor decides to blow the whistle (Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & 
Miceli, 2004). The level of egregiousness of the wrongdoing is a predictor to both 
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whistleblowing intention and level of retaliation (Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 
2004). Near and Miceli (1985) made a point to not place emphasis on the level of 
severity. Doing so allowed for the whistleblower to report on unethical actions rather 
than just a legality issue. Accordingly, wrongdoing can also be a part of an observer’s 
cost-benefit analysis where the severity of the wrongdoing is weighed against the 
observer’s personal risks (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013; Gundlach et al., 2003; Heink, 
2008; Keil et al., 2010).  
As federal and state statutes offer whistleblowers protection against employer 
retaliation and provide a financial reward, whistleblowing is occurring with more 
frequency. However, there are many barriers that prevent potential whistleblowers from 
coming forward including fear of retaliation from employers and fear of challenging an 
organizational hierarchy’s actions (Kaptein, 2011; Miceli et al., 2009; Near & Jensen, 
1983). Near and Jensen (1983) predicted that organizations retaliate to a whistleblowing 
act in a rationalistic, strategic, or random manner.  
Cassematis and Wortley (2013) hypothesized that whistleblowers believed that 
they should blow the whistle as a duty to their organization. They also hypothesized that 
the whistleblower believed their organization valued the reporting of the unethical or 
illegal act. Both hypotheses were confirmed. Additionally, they tested the role of 
egregiousness and how it impacted reporting which showed that whistleblowers took 
into consideration the level of severity. 
Kaptein (2008), using the Corporate Ethical Virtues Model, tested eight 
dimensions (e.g., clarity, congruency of local and senior management, feasibility, 
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supportability, transparency, discussability, and sanctionability) to examine the influence 
of organizational culture in promoting or impeding reporting practices. The results 
indicated that perceived positive and negative attributes of culture do not accurately 
predict whistleblowing intention. Miceli & Near (1992b) claimed that women are less 
likely than men to whistleblow likely stemming from perceived power within the 
organizational environment. However, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found 
the opposite through their meta-analysis. This was further supported by Keil et al. (2010) 
that females are more likely than males to not only have an unfavorable reaction to the 
perceived wrongdoing but also following through on whistleblowing intention.  
Ethical Decision-Making 
 Most potential whistleblowers go through a process of ethical decision-making, 
which is defined as, “… a decision that is both legal and morally acceptable to the larger 
community” (Jones, 1991, p. 367). Whistleblowers are presented with a moral issue, or 
the ethical wrongdoing, where the action will affect others (Jones, 1991). In turn, the 
whistleblower then becomes a moral agent, or the person who makes the moral decision 
(Jones, 1991). The moral agent may consider individual moderators (e.g., ego strength, 
field dependence, and locus of control) and situational moderators (e.g., immediate job 
context, organizational culture, and characteristics of the work) when going through a 
decision process (Trevino, 1986). Cottone and Claus (2000) posited that the moral actor 
must go through a decision analysis prior to intention. This decision analysis is, “… a 
step-by-step procedure enabling us to break down a decision into its components, to lay 
them out in an orderly fashion, and to trace the sequence of events that might follow 
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from choosing one course of action or another” (Cottone & Claus, 2000, p. 276). As 
such, prior to blowing the whistle, whistleblowers need to weigh intrinsic (e.g., personal 
gratification) and extrinsic rewards (e.g., financial incentives), against possible 
consequences of whistleblowing. As well, individuals assess a “… benefit-to-costs 
differential” (Keil et al., 2010, p. 787) when faced with a whistleblowing choice.  
 When individuals are faced with the choice to whistleblow, they are essentially 
conducting a cost-benefit analysis (Miceli & Near, 1992a). Keil et al. (2010) buttressed 
this idea by introducing the phrase “…benefit-to-costs differential,” (p. 788) which is the 
net difference between perceived costs and expected benefits of whistleblowing. Much 
of the whistleblowing literature has examined the subject from a business-centric, legal 
perspective since whistleblowing typically initiates from employees who stand to be 
financially rewarded or socially revered for their behavior (Avakian & Roberts, 2011). 
However, if the observer senses adverse consequences will result or face the possibly of 
being ostracized, there is less likelihood of action being taken (Avakian & Roberts, 
2011). Regardless, personal and situational factors will have an effect on the decision 
making process (Dozier & Miceli, 1985).  
Effectiveness of Statutes  
To combat the retaliatory nature of organizations against whistleblowers, the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 were 
introduced and passed to provide protection for whistleblowers. There are over 32 states 
that now have whistleblowing protection in addition to the federal statutes. The 
effectiveness of the statutes is mixed amongst researchers. For example, Dworkin and 
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Near (1987) provided evidence that whistleblowing statutes were not having the overall 
desired effect as they are either not perceived as effective, considered too complex, or 
not truly protecting whistleblowers from retaliation. In fact, Near and Dworkin (1998) 
suggested that most businesses do not have proper compliance programs and offer little 
protection to whistleblowers. Furthermore, Miceli et al. (1999) found that even with 
statutes in place to protect whistleblowers, retaliation has increased steadily in 
incidences over the last twenty years from 16 % to over 33 %. As a result, in 2002, the 
National Whistleblower Center called for more protections to be given to whistleblowers 
(Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, & Miceli, 2004).  
Using a discriminant analysis to test the effectiveness of federal and state 
statutes, Miceli and Near (1984) examined the relationship among beliefs, organizational 
position, and whistleblowing status. A key finding was that without the courts 
guaranteeing potential whistleblowers guaranteed anonymity, observers of wrongdoing 
were unwilling to whistleblow for fear that it would affect their careers. This is 
interesting because under federal whistleblowing statutes a whistleblower, if correct in 
the unethical or illegal reported wrongdoing, would be guaranteed to keep their job. This 
result indicates that a whistleblower values a high career trajectory over the assurance of 
keeping their job. 
Traditional Whistleblowing Antecedents 
Financial Gain 
It is not uncommon for whistleblowers to face retaliatory acts once the act is 
carried out. Miceli and Near (1985) described how retaliation against a whistleblower, 
 26 
 
 
once the whistle has been blown, could lead to the whistleblower feeling ostracized, 
dismissed, devalued, and demoted (Gundlach et al., 2008). Financial reward acts as an 
extension of legal recourse serving as incentive to make a whistleblower “whole” (i.e., 
replacing loss of income) after righting the illegal or ethical wrongdoing (Callahan & 
Dworkin, 1992). Financial gain is the amount of money to be gained for an act or service 
rendered. Callahan and Dworkin (1992) posited that money acting as a motivator is in 
direct correlation to how the potential whistleblower values money.  
 The federal government also safeguards against the loss of job for whistleblowers 
(Dworkin & Callahan, 1992). The federal False Claims Act (1986) was developed to 
protect whistleblowers and ensure that they are properly compensated for their actions. 
There has been a pronounced increase in whistleblowing since the False Claims Act was 
revised emphasizing larger rewards (Miceli & Near, 1994). A potential danger to 
offering a financial reward to a whistleblower is that they may incorrectly report a 
violation in order to receive the financial reward, whistleblow in order save from being 
fired from their job, or withhold information and hide the fraud until the time the 
rewards reach the highest financial incentive level (Carson, Verdu, & Wokutch, 2008; 
Schmitt, 1995). 
Altruism and Prosocial Behavior 
 Leeds’ (1963) described altruism as a voluntary, unselfish act that is not done for 
self-serving reasons and results in good. In all likelihood, a potential whistleblower will 
conduct an internal cost-benefit analysis (Miceli & Near, 1992a). By conducting a cost-
benefit analysis, the actor eliminates the possibly that the whistleblowing act will be 
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altruistic. Dozier and Miceli (1985) contend that satisfying all three criterion of Leeds’ 
(1963) definition of altruism is difficult.  
 Dozier and Miceli (1985) theorized that whistleblowing in a general business 
management setting is likely done as a form of prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior is 
defined as, “... positive social behavior that is intended to benefit other persons. But 
unlike altruism, prosocial actors can also intend to gain rewards for themselves” (Dozier 
& Miceli, 1985, p. 825). Prosocial behavior is akin to altruism in that it allows for the 
whistleblowing act to be for the good of others, satisfying Leeds’ second, and arguably 
most important, criterion for altruism. The main difference altruism and prosocial 
behavior is that prosocial behavior allows for the whistleblower to gain a reward for 
their whistleblowing act, oftentimes in the form of financial security (Dozier & Miceli, 
1985).   
Ethical Beliefs 
 Jensen (1987) defines ethics as, “... the human concern for the degree of rightness 
involved in making intentional and voluntary choices in conduct touching on such moral 
values as justice, goodness, and truthfulness, and which carries the potential for 
significantly affecting other people” (p. 322). Dozier and Miceli (1985) alleged that 
whistleblowers reported wrongdoings under one or more of three normative ethical 
stances, “… (1) utilitarian theory (e.g., costs and benefits), (2) theory of rights (e.g., 
individual entitlement), or (3) theory of justice (e.g., distributional effects of the action) 
(p. 828). Ethical judgment was found to have more of an influence on whistleblowing 
intention rather than actual reporting (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005).  
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 Ethicality is, “… used to refer to a judgment about correctness of a behavior or 
process with reference to contextually normative values” (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013, 
p. 630). Brennan and Kelly (2007) posited that due to ever-changing societal norms, it is 
impractical to classify whistleblowing as, “politically or socially acceptable but also that 
not whistleblowing is to be complicit with the wrongdoers” (p. 63). Miceli, et al. (1999) 
posited that it is becoming more unfeasible for companies to adhere to ethical and lawful 
practices. 
 There is a lack of consensus as to how personal predictors, such as age, gender, 
tenure, and demography, differentiate potential whistleblowers from non-whistleblowers 
(Cassematis & Wortley, 2013). Rothschild & Miethe (1999) found no supporting 
evidence to create a consistent profile for potential whistleblowers based on personal 
indicators. Additionally, it is difficult generalize whistleblowing predictors based on 
ethics as ethics are culturally specific (Chui, 2003). However, Miceli and Near (1996) 
and Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found that there were some personal 
characteristics, namely gender and tenure, that allowed assumptions to be made 
regarding whistleblowing behavior.   
Organizational Justice and Misconduct 
 Distributive (e.g., fairness of outcomes), procedural (e.g., fairness of process), 
and interactional (treatment from superiors) comprise the three dimensions of 
organizational justice. These dimensions have the potential to influence whistleblowing 
intention (Seifert et al., 2010). The whistleblower is reporting an act of civil 
disobedience (Near & Miceli, 1985).  
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 Miceli, Near, Rehg, and Van Scotter (2012) found that perceived organizational 
support played a key role in reporting behavior. The actions of the managers to make the 
employees feel supported can lift morale and encourage reporting of unethical behavior. 
However, inaction to these reports can lead to demoralization. Demoralization is, 
“manifested in the extent to which employees perceive they are supported in the 
organization” (Miceli, et al., 2012, p. 927). However, regardless of the organizational 
support, managers still may take an employee’s proactive stance as a nuisance, which 
could have an adverse effect on the employee’s career (Miceli, et al., 2012). The act of 
blowing the whistle itself should not be considered deviant but may be perceived that 
way by organizational stakeholders. 
 Victor and Cullen (1988) found that organizations are able to wield a positive 
influence on reporting unethical behavior by controlling the ethical climate. An ethical 
climate is defined as "the prevailing perceptions of typical organizational practices and 
procedures that have ethical content” (Victor & Cullen, 1988, p. 101). If the ethical 
climate encourages reporting behavior then the employees will have a sense that it is part 
of their job. Miceli and Near (1995) even suggested that some companies promote 
reporting behavior as a “code of ethics” (p. 691).  
Retaliation 
 In the words of Aeschylus, “No good deed goes unpunished.” Whistleblowers 
have seen retaliatory responses rise from 16 % (1980) to 21 % (1983) to 33 % (1992) 
(Miceli et al., 1999). The fear of reprisal has led to non-reports from employees with 
some quitting their jobs in an effort to minimize their career damage (Casal & Bogui, 
30 
2008; Cassematis & Wortley, 2013). However, contrary to what the movies and 
sensationalized media reports will have you think, retaliation against whistleblowers is 
not universal (Near & Miceli, 1996). 
Rehg (1998) defined retaliation against whistleblowers as, “... an outcome of a 
conflict between an organization and its employee, in which members of the 
organization attempt to control the employee by threatening to take, or actually taking, 
an action that is detrimental to the well-being of the employee, in response to the 
employee’s reporting, through internal or external channels, a perceived wrongful 
action” (p. 17). Near, Rehg, Van Scotter, and Miceli (2004) found that whistleblowers 
both experience and are threatened with retaliation after whistleblowing. Retaliation 
includes: coworkers not associating with the whistleblower, coworkers not socializing 
with the whistleblower, withholding information needed to successfully perform job, 
verbal harassment or intimidation, poor performance appraisal, denial of award or 
promotion, and assignment of less desirable duties (Near, et al., 2004). In addition to 
retaliation, isolation, and loss of employment, Chui (2003) reported, “… that 90 per cent 
of whistleblowers lose their job or are demoted” (p. 66).  
Mesmer-Mangus and Viswesvaron (2005) place, “whistleblowing retaliatory 
predictors into four categories: (1) characteristics of the whistleblower, (2) actions taken 
by the whistleblower in reporting organizational wrongdoing, (3) situational or 
environmental variables related to the organization, and (4) characteristics of the 
wrongdoing or wrongdoer” (p. 282). There are predictors of retaliation based on 
demographic characteristics such as pay, age, education, tenure, gender, and race (Near 
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& Miceli, 1996). Job situation characteristics (e.g., performance, role) also predict 
retaliation.  
The retaliatory response to internal whistleblowing is reported at a staggering 
(approximately) 66 % (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999). Whistleblowers may choose to 
externally report to minimize the retaliatory effects from their employers (Cassematis & 
Wortley, 2013). Rehg et al. (2008) posit that external reporting occurs due to one of 
three reasons: (1) the act is so intolerable that the whistleblower does not want to risk 
management not doing anything about it, (2) going public will ensure protection, and (3) 
to get back at the organization as a form of organizational justice (p. 227). However, 
Miceli & Near (1986) found that whistleblowers that reported via an external channel 
experienced more severe retaliation. If management reacts in a retaliatory manner 
towards an employee and vocalizes it to the rest of the employees they can be doing so 
to ward off any other potential reports (Miceli & Near, 1986). 
Cassematis and Wortley (2013) found that fear of reprisal were more commonly 
found to be a deciding factor for non-whistleblowers than whistleblowers. The 
researchers rationalized that retaliation was a consideration that was taken into account 
via a cost-benefit analysis prior to the whistleblowing act. Gundlach et al. (2003) 
accused management of offensive impression to give the employee a threat of retaliation 
to dissuade the whistleblowing. Conversely, the threat of reprisal could have an adverse 
effect on the whistleblower by serving to strengthen their resolve and encourage 
whistleblowing behavior (Miceli & Near, 1992). 
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Loyalty 
 Loyalty is closely aligned with tenure. Tenure can be loosely defined as, “loyalty 
and competence over time” (Cassematis & Wortley, 2013, p. 618). Larmer (1992) claims 
that, “... duties of loyalty and confidentiality are to their employers and that 
whistleblowing cannot be justified except on file basis of a higher duty to the public 
good” (p. 125). Loyalty takes many different forms in whistleblowing (Hersh, 2002; 
Jensen, 1987; Judd 1999). The whistleblower has to weigh whether it is more important 
to be loyal to the organization for which they work or to society as a whole. Miceli and 
Near (1986) posited that loyalty to an organization allows for an employee to rationalize 
turning a blind eye to the unethical or illegal act. Duska (2007) found that 
whistleblowers are often represented as disloyal employees and that whistleblowing 
went “... against the duty of an employee towards a company” (p. 156). Duska (2007) 
argued that there is a moral difference between persons and corporations. 
 The whistleblower needs to take into consideration family, friends, and 
coworkers (Hersh, 2002). Rothschild and Miethe (1999) view whistleblowers as disloyal 
traitors who go against organizational norms. Grant (2002) calls whistleblowers “saints 
of secular culture.” Bouville (1989) felt that whistleblowers had to decide to, “betray 
one’s humanity or one’s company” (p. 579). However, the level of organizational 
commitment, according to Somers and Casal (1994), has little effect on whether one is 
willing to whistleblow.  
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Aggregate Whistleblowing Summary 
In sum, the whistleblowing process is unique to each case and changes based on 
the characteristics of the whistleblower, level of perceived severity, and organizational 
climate. Likewise, in any whistleblowing situation an ethical decision is going to be 
made. That decision is based on both applied and situational ethics. Likely, that decision 
will be informed by an internal cost-benefit analysis. Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (1985) 
argued that regardless of the ethical decision-making model one subscribes to it is 
important to note that, “ethical decision-making models do not make ethical decisions 
but describe a process for examining a situation” (Cottone & Claus, 2000, p. 278).   
The level of wrongdoing informs an observer of an unethical or illegal 
wrongdoing. The perceived level of severity coupled with the observer’s morals and 
ethical disposition will determine whistleblowing intention. An observer’s personal and 
moral ethics are unique to each case of whistleblowing. Altruism can act as an 
overriding theme serving as a whistleblowing motive. Likewise, prosocial behavior can 
act as either an overriding theme (e.g., primary motive) but also as an underpinning 
theme (e.g., secondary motive) in the whistleblowing process. However, there is no 
consensus that personal predictors can be generalized in whistleblowing intention. 
The effectiveness of whistleblowing protection has come a long way in the last 
thirty years but still falls short in many areas. First, the federal statutes are vague and 
typically deal with large whistleblowing cases. Second, the state statutes are inconsistent 
in both continuity of protections and application, as well as judgments rendered in cases. 
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However, too often when organizational misconduct occurs there is inadequate 
protection to ward off retaliatory acts against the whistleblower (Rehg, et al., 2008). 
Whistleblowing in Sport 
Hersh (2002) stated that whistleblowing has many different management theories 
to guide qualitative inquiries but many of those theories has yet to be empirically tested. 
Further, while there is research, albeit limited, on whistleblowing in sport, no empirical 
models have been tested in this context. The research also contains facets of the 
aforementioned concepts established in this prior literature, which may not be best suited 
for studying whistleblowing in a sport context.   
Sport is especially germane to this discussion since the context aligns with 
traditional business models (Richardson & McGlynn, 2011); leading to the assumption 
that sport is simply an extension of big business. From a bottom-line fiduciary 
perspective this is true. However, sport does somewhat distance itself from traditional 
business models in that employees (e.g., athletic staff, coaches, and athletes) and 
consumers (e.g., boosters, fans, students, etc.) are highly identified with the sport team 
(e.g., professional) or university (e.g., collegiate) and exhibit high levels of emotional 
and affective attachment (Goldsmith & Walker, 2014; Lock & Filo, 2012; Zagacki & 
Grano, 2005). When considering the more recent whistleblowing cases (e.g., New 
Orleans Saints ‘Bounty-gate’, New England Patriots ‘Spy-gate’ and ‘Deflate-gate’, 
University of Southern California and Reggie Bush, Atlanta Hawks and Michael Gearon 
Jr., and the ‘Penn State Scandal’), the antecedent conditions appear different from that of 
mainstream business. Whistleblowing is more likely to occur if the whistleblower feels 
35 
victimized rather just a witness to a wrongdoing (Giacalone & Promislo, 2010). For 
example, the antecedent conditions in the foregoing examples appeared to center on 
revenge, personal advancement, and/or competitive advantage. However, the lack of 
empirical data leaves these observations open for discussion.   
While the outcomes of whistleblowing in sport can be considered prosocial 
behavior (e.g., the act rights an illegal or ethical wrongdoing, or rules violation), the 
concept also seems to operate under the guise of situational ethics. Internal (e.g., 
administration, coaches, and players) and external (e.g., fans and boosters) stakeholders 
(Richardson & McGlynn, 2014) are part of a “win at all costs” environment where 
prosocial behavior is an underpinning theme while other antecedent conditions act as 
overriding themes. In essence, whistleblowing can be used as a calculated strategy 
intended to gain an advantage either professionally (e.g., personal advancement) or 
within the confines of the game itself (e.g., competitive advantage) rather than simply 
righting of an ethical wrongdoing through prosocial behavior. As such, there is an 
inherent pressure placed on coaches and players (e.g., internal stakeholders) by 
management, fans, and boosters (e.g., external stakeholders) to potentially wait to 
whistleblow and in effect delay the prosocial behavior (Benford, 2007; Richardson & 
McGlynn, 2014; Zagacki & Grano, 2005).  
In general management whistleblowing literature, empirical research indicated 
that internal reporting is the preferred means of reporting (Near & Miceli, 1996). 
External reporting is only done when the internal option is unknown or suspected 
retaliation will occur (Near & Miceli, 1996). In collegiate sport there seems to be a 
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difference in antecedent conditions between reporting within the university (e.g., self-
reporting) and outside of the university (e.g., whistleblowing). Collegiate sport operates 
under the guise of amateurism despite the fact it follows traditional business models by 
incorporating sponsors and corporate stakeholders (McCormick & McCormick, 2008; 
Richardson & McGlynn, 2011). Reporting practices are different depending on if the 
whistle is blown either internally (e.g., self-reporting) and externally (e.g., 
whistleblowing). The chosen channel acts as a means to minimize, or maximize, 
potential harm to an organization (Richarson & McGlynn, 2010).  
The antecedent conditions for internal reporting could be self-serving or 
prosocial in nature. When engaging in unethical or rule violating behavior athletic 
departments may expend more time hiding the illicit activities in order to not get caught 
(Zimbalist, 1999). In turn, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) deems 
the penalty is less harsh if the infraction is self-reported. It is reasonable to assume that 
self-reporting is more likely aimed at minimizing the potential penalty that is associated 
with the wrongdoing rather than getting caught and facing a harsher penalty. This moves 
the intention to report the unethical act away from exhibiting altruistic or prosocial 
behavior.  
 External reporting (e.g., to the media or a governing body) typically comes in the 
form of whistleblowing. The external report could come from either an internal or 
external stakeholder with first-hand knowledge of infraction (Near & Miceli, 1985). 
Employees act as an inside source having first-hand information, thus becoming 
“critical” (Miceli, et al., 2008, p. 2) and “increasingly important,” (Miceli & Near, 2005, 
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p. 100) to whistleblowing cases (Kaptein, 2010). If affiliated with the organization, the 
stakeholder could be someone who failed to internally report the wrongdoing or 
attempted to report internally and were blocked by those in higher job positions. Miceli 
and Near (1989) noted that there are a several factors as to why someone would fail to 
internally report/whistleblow, including fear of organizational retaliation, alienation, or 
potential loss of employment.  
 Another possible stakeholder could be someone who is in direct competition with 
the organization that is participating in the wrongdoing. For example, Coach “X” has 
inside knowledge that opposing Coach “Y” has consistently committed rules violations 
when recruiting. As a result of these blatant violations Coach “X” lost out on multiple 
recruits to Coach “Y”. If Coach “X” whistleblows regarding these rules infractions then 
the player who was improperly recruited (e.g., committing a rules violation) would likely 
not be able to sign with Coach “Y” and the university who committed the wrongdoing. 
Hypothetically, the whistleblower could wait until the timing is right, and when the 
information best suits their needs; report the infraction, oftentimes for their (oft self-
serving) gain. In turn, instances such as these largely discount the possibility of the 
whistleblowing intentions being solely altruistic.  
Sport-Focused Whistleblowing Model 
 While prosocial behavior may be a fairly common motive for employees in a 
traditional business context (Dozier & Miceli, 1985), the antecedent conditions for 
whistleblowing should be somewhat different in the sport world. For example, although 
many would argue that the socially constructed phenomenon of sport instills altruistic 
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values and morality (Stoll & Beller, 2000; Vermillion, 2007), it also produces a wide 
array of deleterious behaviors that are magnified by the media (e.g., cheating, academic 
scandal, drug use, institutional cover-ups, gambling, improper benefits, etc.). And like 
any context where the financial stakes are particularly high, deviant behaviors are likely 
to manifest, particularly in collegiate sport (Benford, 2007; Humpreys, 2012). This is 
based on the concept that sport possesses some unique characteristics such as the high 
visibility of players, coaches, and teams, strict conduct regulations, increased 
commercialism, corporate sponsorships, and lofty endorsement deals (Flowers 2009; 
McCormick & McCormick, 2008; Richardson & McGlynn, 2011). As well, higher levels 
of emotional and affective attachment are associated with internal and external sport 
stakeholders making sport behavior more unique than that of traditional business 
(Goldsmith & Walker, 2014; Lock & Filo, 2012; Zagacki & Grano, 2005). In addition to 
all the underlining causes and reasons in the aforementioned, there are three additional 
elements that make sport a unique context for the whistleblowing phenomenon.  
First, most whistleblowing cases in sport deal with rule-breaking and/or unethical 
behavior, as opposed to illegalities, which merit criminal investigations in the business 
world. The sporting world has been riddled with scandal as a result of various 
whistleblowing cases in recent years (e.g., Miami University, Reggie Bush and USC, 
Cam Newton and Auburn University). University athletic departments are beginning to 
see a marked increase in whistleblowing, both internally and externally, from their 
coaches, faculty, staff, and athletes for unethical behavior (Benford, 2007; Richardson & 
McGlynn, 2011). 
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Second, as previously mentioned, altruism is likely not the underpinning motive 
for whistleblowing in sport. Previous literature suggested that the three altruism 
criterions proposed by Leeds (1963) are unlikely to be met in any whistleblowing case 
(Dozier & Miceli, 1985). However, Dozier and Miceli (1985) maintained that 
whistleblowing could be performed as prosocial behavior, which is closely aligned to 
altruism, with the prosocial behavior allowing for the whistleblower to intend to gain 
personal rewards. Whistleblowing, in general, should be seen as a prosocial behavior as 
long as it rights a wrongdoing. From a legal standpoint, both the business and sport 
contexts offer the whistleblower the same protection against losing their livelihood after 
a whistleblowing report is filed at the federal and state level. The key difference between 
the two contexts is that prosocial behavior could result in a possible monetary reward in 
the business world but not in the sport setting. Most notably, in business there are federal 
whistleblowing statutes that were put in place to increase willingness to whistleblow by 
offering a financial reward (Callahan & Dworkin, 1992). On the contrary, while sport is 
considered a business there is no monetary reward for a whistleblower in sport. 
Additionally, based on the evidence of major whistleblowing cases in sport, 
whistleblowing is done externally (e.g., to the media or a governing body) for self-
serving purposes, such as gaining a competitive advantage (e.g., New England Patriots 
‘Spy-gate’), getting revenge against a former employer/team/or teammate (e.g., Jose 
Canseco and Major League Baseball), and/or for personal advancement (e.g., Atlanta 
Hawks and Michael Gearon Jr.). 
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The third and most salient factor is organizational affiliation. Whistleblowers 
typically have inside information about the organization and report the wrongdoing 
either internally, to management (e.g., athletic department compliance office), or 
externally, to the law or media outlet (e.g., ‘Penn State Scandal’). Understandably, the 
majority of organizations would prefer the internal reporting channel to minimize public 
exposure (Near, 1989). It should be noted that research has indicated that both reporting 
methods (i.e., internal and external) do not significantly differ and both would have a 
similar cost-benefit analysis for the observer (Dworkin & Near, 1987). In sport, 
however, external complaints tend to be observed when the whistleblower is no longer 
affiliated with the university or an athlete (e.g., Reggie Bush, New England Patriots 
‘Spy-gate’, and Jose Canseco). Oftentimes, the whistleblower is someone who was 
complicit in the wrongdoing while working within the organization but due to strong 
attachment to the organization decides not to whistleblow out of loyalty (e.g., New 
Orleans Saints ‘Bounty-gate’) (Vadera, Aguilera, & Caza, 2009). Thus, it is reasonable 
to assume that external whistleblowing is done for self-serving reasons that extend 
beyond prosocial behavior.  
Theoretical Framework 
Kohlberg’s Cognitive Moral Development  
Kohlberg’s Cognitive Moral Development (1969) theorizes that when one is 
faced with an ethical dilemma the actor falls into one of six categories that inform their 
moral decision-making. In level three (e.g., conformity and mutual expectations) of 
Kohlberg’s (1969) model, actors try to live up to the behavior of those close to them 
 41 
 
 
(Trevino, 1986). This explains why being affiliated could lessen the likelihood of 
whistleblowing intention when a wrongdoing occurs. However, when the actor is no 
longer affiliated they move back into the second level (e.g., instrumental purpose and 
exchange) of Kohlberg’s (1969) model and can report the wrongdoing, more than likely 
for self-serving reasons. As seen with many recent whistleblowing cases (e.g., New 
Orleans Saints ‘Bounty-gate’, New England Patriots ‘Spy-gate’ and ‘Deflate-gate’, 
University of Southern California and Reggie Bush, and Jose Canseco and Major League 
Baseball) the actor deemed the wrongdoing acceptable, or not worthy of reporting, 
during the time they worked for the organization. However, when the observer was able 
to garner self-serving benefits after leaving the organization, they reported the 
wrongdoing. In these cases, whistleblowing acts were tactical ploys and the prosocial 
behavior of righting an ethical wrongdoing became the lesser motive. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to surmise that as long as the actor is currently affiliated with an organization, 
the whistleblowing act of a known wrongdoing is less likely to occur. 
Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) is another lens though which to view 
one’s behavioral control as it relates to whistleblowing. Attribution theory is framed as 
the way one combines, gathers, and interprets information in order to form a causal 
judgment (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 23). A causal judgment as it relates to 
whistleblowing would be the relationship of an event (e.g., whistleblowing) and a 
secondary event (e.g., the subsequent social consequences). When the first event is 
carried out it is understood what the ramifications will be on second event. This idea is 
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important because it helps explain one’s disposition, or current behavior, while also 
predicting future behavior (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967), since attribution theory helps 
explain one’s actions. Attributions can be both internal and/or external. An internal 
attribution could be an employee justifying losing their job by believing they are not as 
qualified or skilled as whoever is replacing them (e.g., a coach of a team that had a 
losing season). External attributions using the same example would be the coach 
blaming their superiors for lack of institutional support, for example, a coach who 
believes they were not given enough time to build a contending team.  
Festinger’s Cognitive Dissonance Theory 
 A popular attribution theory that can frame perceived behavioral control in 
relation to whistleblowing is Festinger’s Cognitive Dissonance Theory (1957). This 
theory further explains the applicability of Attribution Theory. Cognitive Dissonance 
occurs when there is disconnect between two cognitive elements. There is typically 
uneasiness or discomfort with a person being aware of their negative action. Therefore, 
to create consonance, a person will attempt to justify their negative action in order to 
gain self-acceptance of the negative act. Festinger (1957) referred to these elements as, 
“… the things a person knows about himself, about his behavior, and about his 
surrounding” (p. 9). An example of this might be a strength and conditioning coach who 
has knowledge of an athlete who is taking performance-enhancing drugs, which are 
illegal in collegiate sport and can lead to suspension. In order to justify not reporting this 
information, the coach claims he could cost the athlete his scholarship and potential 
livelihood if he reports on it. Justifying the non-report allows the coach to feel at ease 
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with his negative action. A similar example could be, a compliance officer in a 
university’s athletic department who witnessed a student-athlete cheating on an exam 
(unethical act) before traveling to a game and decided not to report the act, knowing that 
it could lead to that athlete being suspended. To justify not reporting the unethical act 
(e.g., whistleblowing), the employee justifies the decision based on the game being 
worth millions of dollars to the university at-large and that the suspension of the player 
would adversely affect that outcome. As a result of justification and affirmation of the 
negative decision (e.g., behavior) increasing, dissonance becomes less stimulated.  
Theory of Planned Behavior 
 Ajzen (1991) theorized that, “as a general rule, the stronger the intention to 
engage in a behavior, the more likely should be its performance” (p. 181). Simply, 
intention is the amount of effort put in to performing a behavior. The Theory of Planned 
Behavior (Ajzen, 1985, 1991), an extension to the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 1975), attempted to explain behavioral intentions under volitional control (e.g., 
the person’s ability to perform or not perform the behavior at will by focusing on the 
antecedents that lead to intention). Ajzen (1991) noted that in order to better predict 
behavior, attention should be paid to the following three antecedents: (1) attitude toward 
the behavior, (2) subjective norms, and (3) perceived behavioral control, which leads to 
intention and then possible behavior. The key difference between TRA, and the TPB, is 
the TPB allows for perceived behavioral control, the ease or difficulty of performing the 
behavior as an antecedent to intention. This addition is important because it is possible to 
have a favorable attitude towards an object and positive social pressures, but be unable 
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to perform a behavior. In whistleblowing, this can be seen by someone who feels 
morally or ethically obliged to whistleblow (e.g., a favorable attitude) and is encouraged 
by their organization’s mission statement of support in reporting the unethical act (e.g., 
positive social pressures) but who ultimately fail to report the incident (e.g., unable to 
perform the act) because of the outcome of a personal internal cost-benefit analysis. 
Essentially, the actor may feel that the outcome of the whistleblowing act doesn't 
outweigh the feeling of being compelled to report the wrongdoing regardless of positive 
social support.   
The TPB can be used to show how antecedents to behavioral intention shape that 
behavior, as attitude shapes intention. Zaichkowsky (1985) noted when studying 
involvement, attitudes change based on antecedents. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
surmise if attitudes can change based on antecedents then the subsequent behavior 
resulting from antecedent change will be influenced. In the case of whistleblowing, for 
example, the initial reaction by the actor towards an illegal or unethical wrongdoing 
could be to engage in prosocial behavior, which will dictate their behavioral intention to 
whistleblow. During this time the actor may place positive values on the antecedents of 
attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. 
However, each antecedent that predicts behavior intention can change due to potential 
negative barriers (e.g., perceived alienation from coworkers or fear of reprisal in form of 
retaliation from a boss) as more thought is put into the potential outcomes of the 
whistleblowing act.  
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Antecedent conditions in sport appear different than that of mainstream business, 
seemingly centering on revenge, competitive advantage, or personal advancement while 
functioning as a form of self-serving gain rather than altruistic or prosocial behavior. In 
order to better understand the TPB as it relates to whistleblowing, it is crucial to define 
and explain each of the TPB antecedents that lead to intention, which will ultimately 
shape the behavior. Attitude toward the behavior (e.g., behavioral belief) is comprised of 
an individual’s favorable or unfavorable assessment towards the behavior (Ajzen, 1991). 
This can be seen in the sport context as the moral and ethical considerations of an 
individual towards a perceived rule breaking, unethical, or illegal act/behavior.  
 Subjective norms (e.g., normative beliefs) are, “… concerned with the likelihood 
that referent individuals or groups approve or disapprove of performing a given 
behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 195). Loyalty, or distain, towards an affiliated organization 
oftentimes plays a key role in one’s subjective norms. This normative belief shapes 
whether the act of whistleblowing behavior is met with approval or disapproval and 
influences intention.  
 Lastly, perceived behavioral control (e.g., control beliefs) is the amount of ease 
or difficulty that the person believes there to be when determining whether to perform a 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991). It is expected that perceived behavioral control in 
whistleblowing be done via an internal best cost-benefit analysis where expected gains 
and perceived costs are evaluated to inform the ease or difficulty to whistleblow. 
Regardless of an actor’s desire to engage in prosocial behavior, the cost-benefit analysis 
will dictate the readiness of these actors to determine their behavior. It is likely that 
 46 
 
 
actors with fewer barriers and/or less costs to gains are likely more willing to 
whistleblow than actors who face potential barriers and/or perceive their costs to 
outweigh their gains.  
 Ajzen (1991) further determined that the presence or absence of resources, 
generally found through second-hand information, would have a direct effect on the 
willingness to perform a behavior. Understandably, fewer obstacles and more resources 
allows for greater perceived control. The associated negative implications and social 
consequences of whistleblowing are omnipresent when considering intention to 
whistleblow. The fewer perceived barriers (e.g., organizational support) and the 
organization’s history towards those who whistleblow will allow for greater perceived 
control. 
Conceptual Model 
The act of whistleblowing centers on reporting an illegal (or unethical) act by an 
observer who has inside information of the wrongdoing. Sport offers a unique lens 
through which to study whistleblowing since the context does not follow the traditional 
whistleblowing model, particularly regarding the antecedent conditions of the practice. 
In studying the increased incidence of whistleblowing in sport, it is vital to understand 
the antecedent conditions that underpin whistleblowing intentions. As seen in Figure 1, 
and given that data on whistleblowing in sport is limited, a conceptual model for 
whistleblowing in sport is preliminarily presented. The model is especially focused on 
the antecedent conditions that may lead to a whistleblowing intention. Additionally, 
since the actor is likely to consider the possible ramifications of the act, a cost-benefit 
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analysis (e.g., affiliation and ethical disposition) should assume a mediating role in the 
model. While there are many antecedents for possibly blowing the whistle in sport, the 
content analysis gleaned five antecedent conditions that act as themes suggested of 
having a most positive relationship on whistleblowing intention.  
 
 
Figure 1: Whistleblowing in Sport Conceptual Model  
 
 
Altruism 
 
Altruism is defined as, “… a behavior of an unselfish act to the welfare of others 
that meets three criteria: (1) the act is an end in itself and is not done for self-serving 
reasons; (2) it is a voluntary act; and (3) the act results in good” (Leeds, 1963, p. 230). 
Using Leeds’ (1963) altruistic criteria, in order for the whistleblowing act to be purely 
altruistic, there would be no relationship with cost-benefit analysis. There are few cases 
of whistleblowing in sport that are reported from a purely altruistic perspective. This is 
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evidenced by the impression that many of the known whistleblowing cases are reported 
after the whistleblowers affiliation with the organization has been terminated. 
Additionally, within both professional and collegiate sport there is an inherent pressure 
to not challenge the organizational (or social) norms making it difficult to make the 
decision to whistleblow without, at the very least, conducting an internal cost-to-benefit 
analysis (Richardson & McGlynn, 2014).  
 Altruism can be best explained through the use of the Theory of Planned 
Behavior. Lee, Lee, and Kang (2003) found that certain adults have a predisposition for 
altruistic behavior. If an actor is altruistic by nature then it should be fairly easy for them 
ascertain the correct course of action in order to right an ethical wrong. As such, the 
actor would then promptly proceed through the three antecedents of planned behavior. 
The attitude toward the behavior of whistleblowing meets Leeds’ first criteria in that the 
actor would positively value righting an ethical wrong, thus carrying out the act for a 
non-self-serving reason. An altruistic person, having high moral character and moral 
motivation, would have strong beliefs in their subjective norms. In this case it is the 
individual’s perception of the whistleblowing behavior in order to help others. An 
altruistic actor would be solely concerned with performing the act voluntarily (criteria 
two) in order to help another (criteria three) resulting in ease of performing the behavior 
(e.g., perceived behavioral control).   
A recent example of an (self-reported) altruistic whistleblowing behavior dealt 
with collegiate athletics. Auburn University professor, James Gundlach, who would 
internally blow the whistle to his sociology department and the athletics department, 
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alleged academic fraud. When both departments took inadequate action, Gundlach 
externally blew the whistle to the New York Times (New York Times, 2006). Gundlach 
was upset over what he felt was the athletics department eluding the NCAA and students 
receiving preferential treatment and unearned grades. He claimed to have reported 
externally to right this ethical wrong. Gundlach received no compensation or reward for 
his actions claiming them to be altruistic in nature and retired from his position a short 
time later.  Thus, the following proposition was constructed:  
Proposition 1: In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with 
whistleblowing if they exhibit altruistic behavior. Altruistic behavior can serve as 
the overriding theme. 
Prosocial Behavior 
Despite Leeds’ (1963) assertion that to be altruistic you cannot conduct a cost-
benefit analysis or intend to receive a form of reward, it can be argued that regardless of 
one’s selfless intentions of whistleblowing, considerations prior to the act are 
considered. Dozier and Miceli (1985) posited that whistleblowing is done as prosocial 
behavior because it is extremely difficult to satisfy all three criteria for altruistic 
behavior. Staub (1978) offered an alternative to altruistic behavior that focused on 
satisfying the most important criteria, doing a good deed or act. Differing from Leeds, 
Staub (1978) allowed for the actor to accept a reward for the good deed. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, prosocial behavior is defined as, “… positive social 
behavior that is intended to benefit other persons but unlike altruism, prosocial actors 
can also intend to gain rewards for themselves” (Dozier & Miceli, 1985, p. 825). 
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A person could be guided to whistleblow by their personal ethics and also want 
to report the act for no other reason than to right the wrongdoing but it would be hard to 
convince a rational thinking person that the whistleblower did not even consider the 
cost-benefit ratio prior to blowing the whistle (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). A more likely 
explanation would be that the whistleblower was exhibiting “positive deviance”, or the 
act of an intentional behavior that departs from the norm to right an ethical wrong in a 
moral manner (Vadera et al., 2009). Gundlach, Douglas, and Martinko (2003), through 
their social information processing theory, proposed that only if the potential 
whistleblower believes the benefits of whistleblowing outweigh the costs would they be 
more apt to whistleblow. Prior to making a decision it is normal to evaluate a situation to 
weigh the pros and cons, conduct a cost-benefit analysis, and/or look at the situation 
from an ethical standpoint (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). That is not to say that the entire 
cost-benefit process does not happen quickly and without ample thought but the fact that 
it happens aligns the behavior as being prosocial instead of altruistic.  
It is important to note that collegiate sports have (more) stakeholders involved 
within the organization (e.g., faculty, students, and staff) who may not have a vested 
interest in the success of the athletic programs but who are still privy to inside 
information. The stakeholders then could have less affiliation, which affects 
whistleblowing intention, than that of professional sports. However, even if there is no 
personal vested interest in the success of the athletic programs the actor may take other 
factors into consideration. Swartz and Watkins (2003) offered that one would take into 
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account the relationship of many actors (e.g., organization, subordinates, colleagues, 
peers, and family) when deciding whether or not to whistleblow.  
Brief and Motowidlo (1986) defined a behavior as prosocial in theory if it 
satisfied three tenets: “(1) a member of an organization performed the act, (2) the act is 
directed toward an individual, group, or organization, and (3) the act is performed with 
the intention of promoting welfare” (p. 711). If in the aforementioned James Gundlach 
scenario, the whistleblowing case that dealt with collegiate athletics and academic fraud, 
failed a tenet of altruism (for example, maybe he had a self-serving reason to 
whistleblow) the act would still be considered prosocial behavior. The act came from a 
member of an organization, was directed towards that organization, and was performed 
to promote welfare (e.g., righting an ethical wrongdoing). Thus, the following 
proposition was constructed:  
Proposition 2: In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with 
whistleblowing if they exhibit prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior acts as the 
overriding condition. 
Revenge  
 
Revenge is defined as, “… the infliction of harm in return for perceived wrong” 
(Stuckless & Goranson, 1992, p. 25). According to Bies, Tripp, and Kramer (1997), 
perceived personal harm or violation to one’s social order is a cognitive and behavioral 
response. These emotions include feeling ostracized, dismissed, devalued, and demoted 
(Gundlach et al., 2008). Much of the revenge literature has centered on antisocial 
behavior (Robinson & O'Leary-Kelly, 1998) and feuding (Kim & Smith, 1993). In 
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theory, those who feel wronged go through similar emotions as a whistleblower would 
(e.g., cost-benefit analysis and ethical considerations). If a former employee feels as 
though they were wronged, cheated, or let go/fired without just cause, they may feel the 
need for revenge (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). 
 The sport landscape is littered with feuds between organizations (e.g., WWE and 
MMA, over which is the true sport), universities (e.g., Texas and Texas A&M, over 
which is premier football program in Texas), teams (e.g., New England Patriots and the 
New York Jets, over Spy-gate), coaches (e.g., Bill Belichek and Eric Mangini, over Spy-
Gate), and players (e.g., Jose Canseco and Alex Rodriguez, over steroid accusations) 
alike. With these feuds there oftentimes comes the desire for revenge.  
 Getting a measure of revenge via whistleblowing is best-explained using 
Festinger’s Cognitive Dissonance Theory (1957). When someone is contemplating an 
act of revenge there is likely disconnect between two cognitive elements. The actor 
knows that his action of revenge likely has some sort of perceived negative outcome 
associated causing the actor uneasiness. To justify whistleblowing, the actor must defend 
his negative action, in this case whistleblowing, not for prosocial behavior but in an 
attempt to seek revenge, to affirm the decision.  
A recent example of whistleblowing used as an act of revenge centered on former 
Major League Baseball (MLB) player, Jose Canseco. Canseco was upset that he was 
made the singular scapegoat of performance-enhancing drug use in MLB (e.g., defense 
of negative action) and sought revenge by blowing the whistle on other steroid users 
(e.g., perceived negative outcome) by describing the sweeping drug use in professional 
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baseball in his book, “Juiced” (Sports Illustration Vault, 2010). Another example is 
former assistant coach of Iowa men’s basketball, Bruce Pearl, who taped a phone 
conversation with a recruit he felt he lost to a rival program because of improper 
benefits. Pearl taped the call and turned the evidence over to the NCAA as revenge for 
losing the star recruit (Sports Illustration Vault, 2010). Based on the foregoing, the 
following proposition was constructed: 
Proposition 3: In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with 
whistleblowing if they seek revenge. Seeking revenge situationally acts as the 
overriding condition, while prosocial behavior as the underpinning condition. 
Competitive Advantage 
 Competitive Advantage is defined as the “… unique position an organization 
develops vis-à-vis its competitors through its patterns of resource deployments” (Reed & 
DeFillippi, 1990, p. 90). According to Ronde (2001) competitive advantage is nothing 
more the willingness or unwillingness to share trade secrets. If you are able to keep your 
information to a select few then you are less likely to cede your competitive advantage.  
 Simply, the best way to keep a secret is not to tell it to anybody. Ronde (2001) 
noted however, “… it might be necessary to share trade secrets with suppliers or 
consultants in order to obtain the right input or the best possible advice” (p. 391) and 
therein lies the rub as it relates to sport. In sport, coaches spend many hours a day 
together working on game plans, sharing practice ideas, and trade secrets. Also, 
coaching staffs face attrition with coaches regularly moving from one organization to 
another. Coaches also may be complicit in helping bend or break the rules due to the 
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pressure to produce results (Chen & Tang, 2006). With an increased emphasis on wins 
and losses a coach is considered successful if they have winning seasons (Richardson & 
McGlynn, 2014). Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that coaches would share each 
other’s secrets in order to gain a competitive advantage.   
 The sporting world consists of many hypercompetitive individuals who are, “… 
manipulative, aggressive, and exploitative in their transactions” (Ryckman, Hammer, 
Kaczor, & Gold, 1990, p. 368). Ryckman, et al. (1990) described how highly 
competitive people in athletics adopt a win at any cost mentality. Day (1984) and Porter 
(1985) postulated that you achieve an advantage of higher performance as the result of 
competitive advantage and superior performance.  
 Competitive advantage in sport typically deals with obtaining resources on the 
opposing team, university, or organization and using those resources to position yourself 
to make a more favorable outcome in comparison to your opponent (e.g., Spy-gate). “If 
the coach’s own behavior is not congruent with the espoused values, coaching becomes 
a manipulative process, dependent ultimately upon coercion” (Burdett, 1998, p. 146). 
Coaches in both collegiate and professional sports have shown a willingness to 
circumvent the rules (e.g., Deflate-gate), take part in unethical wrongdoings (e.g., 
University of North Carolina academic scandal), and use information about the 
opposition in order to gain or maintain a competitive edge (e.g., Ron Wilson).  
Kohlberg’s Cognitive Moral Development (1969) serves as a theoretical guide 
for moral decision-making as it relates to competitive advantage. A recent example of a 
whistleblowing in order to gain competitive advantage centered on Eric Mangini, then 
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coach of the National Football League’s (NFL) New York Jets. Mangini was a former 
assistant coach for New England Patriots under head coach, Bill Belichek. During his 
tenure with the Patriots, Mangini was privy to inside information and practices of the 
Patriots. He knew that it was common practice for the Patriots to videotape coaches’ 
signals during pre-game warm-ups and during games. Mangini, who knew of these 
wrongdoings while a member of the Patriots, never blew the whistle during his time with 
the organization. Mangini exhibited behavior consisting of conformity and mutual 
expectations (e.g., level three of Kohlberg’s model) where actors take on the behavior of 
those close to them (Trevino, 1986), in this case, Belichek. However, in 2007, Mangini 
became the head coach of the rival Jets. As a game against the Patriots approached, 
Mangini decided to blow the whistle on the Patriots, and his former mentor turned 
division rival, in order to ensure that the Patriots no longer were able to have the 
competitive advantage on his team (Sports Illustration Vault, 2010). Mangini exhibited 
behavior consisting of instrumental purpose and exchange (e.g., level two of Kohlberg’s 
model) enabling him to report the wrongdoing, more than likely for self-serving reasons.  
Another example is former coach of the Anaheim Mighty Ducks and San Jose 
Sharks, Ron Wilson, who whistleblew on his former player, and now rival, Teemu 
Selanne. After a game-winning goal was scored against Wilson’s team, he correctly 
claimed that Selanne was using an unauthorized or approved NHL hockey stick. It was 
made known that Wilson had prior knowledge of Selanne’s preference of use of this 
kind of stick from his time coaching him and only whistleblew when he needed to win a 
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game, effectively restoring the competitive advantage (Sports Illustration Vault, 2010). 
Thus, the following proposition was constructed:  
Proposition 4: In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with 
whistleblowing if they seek competitive advantage. Seeking competitive 
advantage situationally acts as the overriding condition, while prosocial 
behavior as the underpinning condition.  
Personal Advancement 
Whistleblowers in both sport and big business are offered whistleblowing 
protection from the federal government in form of ensuring that actors will not lose their 
job for correctly whistleblowing (Dworkin & Callahan, 1992). However, that is the only 
whistleblower protection similarity between the two. Sport whistleblowers are not 
afforded the same financial reward as those in Fortune 500 companies. For example, in 
the collegiate sport setting, reporting violations or ethical wrongdoings is considered part 
of job expectancy and other than the possible recognition of the prosocial behavior by 
their peers there is little else that is afforded to the whistleblower.  
Yet, the motive to whistleblow in sport draws parallels to that of big business in 
that a whistleblower can use the fraud information to their advantage as a form of 
personal advancement. White and Singletary (1993) suggested that professional 
advancement is considered a marker of success in one’s profession. While similarly, 
Boyd and Grumpert (1983) and Burch (1986) suggested that motivations of 
entrepreneurship found that individuals seek independence, opportunity, personal 
rewards, and financial gain (Kuratko, Hornsby, & Naffziger, 1997).  Grouping these 
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concepts for purposes of this dissertation, the working definition for personal 
advancement is, “… the process of improving your career for personal gain within an 
organization in order to get a more important position” (Boyd and Grumpert, 1983; 
Burch, 1986; Kuratko, Hornsby, & Naffziger, 1997; White and Singletary, 1993). 
 As noted by Boyd and Grumpert (1983) and Burch (1986), financial gain is a 
motivation tied to personal advancement. The working definition for financial gain, a 
potential byproduct of personal advancement, is, “… the amount of money to be gained 
for an act or service rendered” (Miceli & Near, 1994). Other than being a byproduct of 
personal advancement, financial gain in sport has seen increased prevalence in collegiate 
athletics in the form of partnerships where money is exchanged (an NCAA rules 
violation), thereby violating a key tenet of amateurism. The whistleblowing is reported 
usually when a partnership ends and one side, usually the actor who gave the financial 
benefits, feels as though the business arrangement did not yield them a proper return on 
the investment. In the sports context, financial gain is typically limited to the interactions 
of sports organizations or agents with coaches and athletes (e.g., SMU death penalty). 
For example, a player is signed (unofficially) by an agent while still in college and 
receives compensation during his collegiate career. However, the player never signs with 
that agent or reimburses him once his collegiate career ends. That agent, knowing the 
arrangement is an NCAA violation, may be compelled to whistleblow on the player for 
financial gain (e.g., recouping payments and damages). This happened to Heisman 
Trophy award winner, Reggie Bush, of University of California. Bush had a failed 
partnership with an agent who provided him and his family improper benefits while in 
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college. The agent sued Bush for financial reimbursement and damages after Bush failed 
to sign with the agent after he became a professional football player. Another recent 
example of a financial gain as a whistleblowing act centered on OJ Mayo, then a USC 
basketball player, and Louis Johnson, a former associate of Mayo. Johnson claimed to 
have inside information on Mayo and alleged that promoter Robert Guillory gave Mayo 
$30,000 and other improper benefits while Mayo was in high school and college (Sports 
Illustration Vault, 2010).  
 An example of personal advancement when framed using Attribution Theory 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991), is the whistblowing scandal surrounding the NBA’s Atlanta 
Hawks and minority owner, Michael Gearon Jr. The Hawks had been losing the owners 
of the franchise money for years. With the recent record selling price of the Los Angeles 
Clippers, a forced sale of the franchise due to owner Donald Sterling’s racist remarks, 
Gearon Jr. set to make a power play to either personally advance within the ownership 
group or force a sale of the franchise to reap financial gain. While on a conference call 
with the majority and minority owners, General Manager, Danny Ferry used insensitive 
racial terminology to describe attributes of free agent, Luol Deng. Gearon Jr. was 
secretly recording the phone conversation as a means to continue to gain, gather, and 
interpret information forming a casual judgment. Gearon Jr., who was not a fan of 
Ferry’s, also uncovered a racially charged email on the same topic from majority owner, 
Bruce Levenson. Gearon Jr. warned that if this information were to be made public it 
could cripple the organization. Later that week it was found that Gearon Jr. leaked the 
email to the press. In this case the causal judgment as it relates to relationship of an 
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event was the leaking of information (e.g., external whistleblowing). Gearon Jr. knew 
the social consequences and ramifications (e.g., the secondary event) of leaking the 
information. The team has since been sold. Thus, attribution theory helps explain Gearon 
Jr.’s actions and behavior (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967). Based on these cases, the 
following proposition was constructed:  
Proposition 5: In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with 
whistleblowing if they seek personal advancement. Seeking personal 
advancement situationally acts as the overriding condition, while prosocial 
behavior as the underpinning condition. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis  
 
 As previously stated, cost-benefit analysis, or benefit-to-cost differential, is the 
net difference between perceived costs and expected benefits of whistleblowing (Keil et 
al., 2010). Gundlach et al. (2003) proposed that potential whistleblowers will only 
whistleblow if they believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. Vader et al. (2009) 
argued that once a transgression happens and a potential whistleblower makes a decision 
to whistleblow they may seek out additional information. The potential whistleblower 
may also weigh the implications and consequences, to their work and non-work 
identities, which in turn will guide on their decision whether or not to whistleblow 
(Verada et al., 2009).  
 Henik (2008) showed that role models, partners, and significant others act as 
‘organizational loyalty disruptors’ and may help facilitate whistleblowing intention. The 
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existence of organizational loyalty disruptors helps explain that there is a cost-benefit 
analysis that takes place in potential whistleblowers helping shape their intention.  
 An example of how performing a cost-benefit analysis, with loyalty as a 
component in the decision making process, can be seen in the whistleblowing case 
against Men’s Basketball Head Coach Dave Bliss and Baylor University. Abar Rouse, 
an assistant coach, secretly audio recorded Bliss actively trying to cover-up his rules 
violations. He turned the evidence over to Baylor and the NCAA leading to the eventual 
resignation of Bliss from his coaching position. Seemingly, Rouse had determined that 
the benefits outweighed the cost when he turned over the evidence. However, as a result 
of his actions Rouse was essentially blackballed from ever coaching again in the 
collegiate ranks. Duke coach Mike Krzyzewski, who is well respected as an ethical 
figure within college sports, has stated that he would never hire, and would fire, any 
coach who secretly recorded him for breach of trust. Rouse later would attempt to sue 
his attorney for leaking his accounting of the events leading to speculation that if he had 
known the repercussions of his actions that he may have made a different decision.  
The researcher maintains that observers, based on human nature, conduct a cost-
benefit analysis prior to making a decision on whistleblowing intention. That being the 
case, a cost-benefit analysis is employed for non-altruistic and self-serving reasons. 
Thus, the following propositions were constructed:  
Proposition 6: In sport, whistleblowing intention increases when the individual 
perceives the differentiation of expected benefits outweighing the perceived costs.  
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Proposition 7: In sport, whistleblowing intention decreases when the individual 
perceives the differentiation of perceived costs outweighing the expected benefits. 
 Future studies should be conducted to test the reliability and validity of the 
proposed model. A qualitative inquiry should be performed to examine the 
whistleblowing in sport phenomenon (e.g., the “how” and “why”). Additionally, the 
qualitative inquiry should investigate whether the antecedent conditions and role of cost-
benefit analysis proposed in the conceptual model act as the suggested themes having a 
most positive relationship on whistleblowing intention. A study testing how “cost-to-
benefit differential” acts as the mediating relationship between whistleblowing factors 
and whistleblowing intentions should be performed (Kiel, et al., 2010).  
 Further, these findings should help frame future studies where the results will 
allow future research to delineate what role the perceived severity of how rules 
violations or unethical acts play on whistleblowing intention in sport. Also, the findings 
should help inform how perceived severity of unethical acts influence the likelihood of 
internal and/or external reporting practices of whistleblowing intention in sport. Lastly, it 
will allow for the investigation of the relationship between personality characteristics 
and perceived severity of how rules violations or unethical acts relates to whistleblowing 
intention in sport. 
 A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) will be performed to assess the model fit 
and the discriminant validity of the constructs. After the model has been revised and 
accepted on the front end and convergent validity is supported, testing will be conducted 
for the moderating effect of affiliation and ethical considerations would have on 
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whistleblowing intention. A later study to determine whether the perception of personal 
characteristics of a whistleblower has a positive, negative, or no effect on the outcomes 
(e.g., punishment) after the whistle has been blown will be piloted. A final study would 
look at the credibility and power an individual has within an organization to see if those 
characteristics deter whistleblower intention through internal channels. 
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CHAPTER III 
INQUIRY INTO WHISTLEBLOWING IN COLLEGIATE SPORT: 
PERCEPTIONS, ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Whistleblowing is a term popularized by Ralph Nader in the early 1970’s as a 
means to take the place of terms like “snitch” in an attempt to assuage the negative 
connotations of reporting unethical acts. Whistleblowing is defined as, “… the disclosure 
by organization members (former and current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate 
practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be 
able to affect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 525). Whistleblowing is viewed in terms 
of the ‘social actor’ and the conditions for the act (Near & Micli, 1996). Three social 
actors: (1) wrongdoer, (2) whistleblower, and (3) recipient of wrongdoing report are 
needed for organizational whistleblowing to take place (Near & Miceli, 1996). 
Whistleblowing is often examined from a legal or policy perspective yielding some 
fairly inconsistent litigious rulings without much precedent being set in the courts (Near 
& Miceli, 1985). Such inconsistencies have led to a number of ways to view 
whistleblowing, prompting scholars to offer tailored definitions and a multitude of 
theories to explain the concept.  
Much of the published data show that the whistleblower is someone who has (or 
had) an affiliation with an organization, and also possesses inside information on the 
accused (Near & Miceli, 1987). When the actor (i.e., possible whistleblower) has 
information regarding an unethical or illegal act, they will conduct an internal cost-
benefit analysis (Keil et al., 2010; Miceli & Near, 1992a). Expectancy theorists claim 
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that blowing the whistle is a function of the actor believing in a high likelihood for 
change because of the act, yielding mainly positive outcomes (Near & Miceli, 1985). 
Intuitively, however, this seems unlikely since there are almost always ramifications 
from reporting a wrong or unethical act (Near & Miceli, 1985).  
Even with statutes to protect the whistleblower from termination or unfair 
treatment in the workplace, there is still the possibility of societal retaliation, which 
makes the decision to whistleblow increasingly difficult. Additionally, while immediate 
monetary compensation (in some cases) may be provided to the whistleblower, it is 
difficult to assess whether this benefit outweighs any longer-term costs of the action. As 
a result, this juxtaposition makes it more difficult to compensate a whistleblower for all 
the risks possibly incurred and muddies the theoretical waters for both defining and 
assessing the antecedents of the phenomenon.   
Among the most meaningful frameworks used to describe whistleblowing is the 
theory of Organizational Commitment on Prosocial Behavior, which was defined by 
Brief and Motowidlo (1986, p. 711) as:  
“… a behavior which is (a) performed by a member of an organization, (b) 
directed toward an individual, group, or organization with whom he or she 
interacts while carrying out his or her organizational role, and (c) 
performed with the intention of promoting the welfare of the individual, 
group, or organization toward which it is directed.”  
 
Street (2011) opined that assessing whistleblowing from a prosocial perspective would 
allow whistleblowers to be viewed as either disgruntled or highly loyal and ethical 
employees. As a result, the manner in which the employee is defined will influence their 
antecedent conditions to whistleblow. Organizational affiliation should then assert a 
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moderating influence on a whistleblowing intention through prosocial behavior and 
organizational commitment. Similarly, Kohlberg’s (1969) Cognitive Moral Development 
Model can be used to assess one’s moral development when determining an individual’s 
intention to whistleblow (Street, 2011). Coupled with prosocial behavior, Kohlberg’s 
(1969) Cognitive Moral Development Model offers a fairly complete picture for 
determining a whistleblowing intention. Additionally, Ajzen (1991) posited that 
attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control are needed to determine 
intention and actions in order to not only to predict, but also explain human behavior. 
Miller (1956) concluded that only a select few beliefs are recalled at any given moment 
despite people having numerous beliefs toward a specified behavior. Ajzen (1991), 
building on this concept, postulated that, “… it is these salient beliefs that are considered 
to be the prevailing determinants of a person’s intentions and actions” (p. 189). Thus, 
differentiating the salient beliefs (i.e., behavioral, normative, and control) help better 
predict intention. 
Despite the accumulation of whistleblowing literature over the past thirty years, 
there has been a surprising lack of research using sport as a context. Using sport as the 
research context is extremely salient with the increased unethical, illegal, or rules 
violation behavior that has been brought to the mainstream in recent years. In order to 
understand the complexities of whistleblowing in sport, a qualitative approach was 
deemed appropriate to examine the whistleblowing phenomenon (i.e., the how and why), 
which is intended to lead to transferability of knowledge (Yin, 2003). The researcher 
conducted a detailed multiple-case study approach using semi-structured interviews 
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among a sample of collegiate sport administrators. This research method helped to 
expose the perception of whistleblowing in sport amongst high-level practitioners. Thus, 
this study addressed the following overarching research question:   
RQ1: What is the perception of whistleblowing in collegiate sport? 
The researcher hypothesized that the sport context offered a different set of 
antecedent conditions for whistleblowing intention than that of traditional business 
perspectives. As such, this qualitative method also aided in identifying the antecedent 
conditions for whistleblowing in sport leading to a set of testable hypotheses on the 
relationship between antecedent conditions and whistleblowing intentions (i.e., the what, 
when, where) to be examined in subsequent research. Thus, the views expressed by the 
participants assisted in answering the following research question:  
RQ2: What are the potential antecedent conditions that influence whistleblowing 
intention in a collegiate sport context? 
Lastly, akin to the findings of previous whistleblowing studies, the researcher 
opined that potential whistleblowers conduct a cost-benefit analysis prior to engaging in 
the act of whistleblowing. The study’s aim was to explain the role of cost-benefit 
analysis by identifying potential factors, including the role of affiliation, which may 
influence whistleblowing intention in sport. The investigation also aimed to determine if 
any of those factors are unique to sport. For this reason, the researcher constructed the 
following research question to address these considerations: 
RQ3: What are potential benefit-to-cost differential considerations that influence 
 whistleblowing intention? 
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Method  
Research Design 
Qualitative research is used as a means to explore phenomena (Newman, 
Ridenour, Newman, & DeMarco, 2003). As such, using Lincoln and Guba (1985) as a 
guide to a naturalistic, qualitative research approach, multiple-case studies were 
conducted in this investigation. Guba and Lincoln (1981) describe a case study as “… a 
snapshot of reality” or “a slice of life” (p. 370-371), which has been formally defined as 
“… an intensive or complete examination of a facet, an issue, or perhaps the events of a 
geographic setting over time” (Denny, 1978, p. 24). A case study allows for 
transferability of knowledge by providing thick description, communication of multiple 
realities, and a unique vehicle to transport a reader to the inquiry setting (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985).  
In order to meet the goal of replicating findings across cases, a multiple-case 
study design was used (Yin, 2003). Stake (1995) suggested that a collective case study is 
analogous to multiple-case studies analyses because more than one case is being 
examined (Baxter & Jack, 2004). This allowed the researcher to draw comparisons 
between cases by exploring the differences within and between cases (Yin, 2003). 
Building on criteria established by Yin (2003) and Miles and Huberman (1994), Baxter 
and Jack (2004) proposed that a rigorous case study needs the following:  
(a) propositions (which may or may not be present) (b) the application of a 
 conceptual framework; (c) development of the research questions (generally 
 “how”  and/or “why” questions); (d) the logic linking data to propositions; and 
 (e) the  criteria for interpreting findings (p. 551).  
 
68 
The context of whistleblowing in sport has yet to be researched in any great 
depth. This qualitative inquiry was juxtaposed against a conceptual model and a set of 
propositions that aimed to answer a set of research questions (e.g., “how” and “why”) in 
a unique setting (e.g., sport), which allowed for criteria to be interpreted. Thus, this 
research method satisfied Baxter and Jack’s (2004) criteria for a rigorous case study. 
Previous investigations into whistleblowing have mostly been conducted using a 
business management-centric perspective. Examining whistleblowing via a sport context 
using a “blank slate” mindset allows for unique findings (Merriam, 2009). Baxter and 
Jack (2004) suggested that a case study, “... supports the deconstruction and the 
subsequent reconstruction of various phenomena” (p. 544). Thus, this comprehensive 
qualitative approach was deemed an appropriate method as it strives for exploration, 
pursues intellectual interest in a phenomenon, and has as its goal the extension of 
knowledge (Merriam, 2009).  
Site and Sample 
Due to limited research on whistleblowing in sport, this research endeavor 
involved two phases. The first phase was comprised of gathering and analyzing 
secondary information (e.g., academic literature, whistleblowing case law, popular press 
articles, reports, and other whistleblowing documents). These documents were gathered 
from the NCAA major infractions database where reported violations are housed. 
Additionally, following Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) grounded theory approach, “... 
designed to develop a well-integrated set of concepts that provide a thorough theoretical 
explanation of social phenomena,” (p. 5) an exhaustive review to find professional, 
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collegiate, and high school whistleblowing cases was performed. Academic literature 
and whistleblowing case law were explored for any apparent violation themes or 
possible motivations. The documents were summarized and collated in a spreadsheet for 
subsequent analyses. This led to a content analysis, which provided the background for 
generating the interview protocol and assisted with interpreting the collected interview 
data from the key organizational informants.  
The second phase involved in-person or recorded phone interviews with 
collegiate sport administrators. To select the most appropriate sample, a purposive 
stratified approach was used, where key informants were drawn from a cross-section of 
collegiate levels (e.g., Division I - FBS, Division I – FCS, and Division II). Table 2 
shows the data collection plan and key informants. This method is preferred over 
random sampling because the typical case does not often yield the richest in information 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). The sampling technique allowed the researcher to select a smaller 
number of rich cases to gain a deeper understanding of whistleblowing. The selection of 
respondents encompassed Athletic Directors, Associate Athletic Directors, Directors of 
Compliance, Assistant Compliance Directors, and Faculty Athletic Representatives. This 
process continued until an adequate representation (and strata) of individuals and 
universities had been achieved.  
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Table 2: Participant Demographics 
Name Gender Job Title Conference 
Affiliation 
NCAA 
Affiliation 
Raylan Male Compliance 
Director 
SEC Division I - FBS 
 Winona Female Compliance 
Director 
NE-10 Division II 
Loretta Female Compliance 
Director 
Ivy League Division I - FCS 
Boyd Male Assistant 
Compliance 
Director 
Big Ten Division I - FBS 
Ava Female Assistant 
Compliance 
Director 
Big 12 Division I - FBS 
Rachel Female Director of 
Athletics 
Ivy League Division I - FCS 
Ellstin Male Athletic Director Big Sky Division I - FCS 
Tim Male Associate 
Athletic Director 
ACC Division I - FBS 
Art Male Faculty Athletic 
Representative 
SEC Division I - FBS 
Wynn Male Faculty Athletic 
Representative 
SEC Division I - FBS 
Data Collection 
A qualitative approach to study the experiences and perceptions of key collegiate 
sport administrators was conducted. Data were collected using semi-structured, in-
person or recorded via telephone, one-on-one, open-ended interviews by the researcher 
with the respondents taking place over a four-week period. Dexter (1970) described an 
interview as “… a conversation with a purpose” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 268). The 
researcher was trained by a lead researcher (i.e., university professor) prior to conducting 
any interviews.  
 71 
 
 
It is vital, if possible, that the researcher have live, in-person visible contact with 
the respondent during the interview. However, if the respondent was unavailable for in-
person contact for the interview a phone interview was conducted. Two interviews were 
conducted in-person while the remaining eight interviews were conducted via phone. 
The researcher audio-recorded the interview, in addition to using field notes, to collect 
data and observations. There was no a priori time limit for the interviews, which 
allowed the respondents ample time become comfortable with the researcher in order to 
freely and openly expound on their responses. However, each interview was tentatively 
scheduled to last between 25-60 minutes, and occurred at multiple venues (e.g., coffee 
house, office suites) or via phone call at the respondent’s convenience and choosing. On 
average each interview lasted 50 minutes, with the longest interview lasting 120 minutes 
and the shortest interview lasting 15 minutes. Respondents were briefed prior to the 
interview, given the interview protocol, informed of consent procedure, and given the 
scope and nature of the interview. Interviews were collected until the researcher either 
finished the interview protocol or information became redundant meeting the criteria for 
theoretical saturation (Merriam, 2009). The interviewer then summarized any major 
findings or perceived categories to the respondent for verification (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985).  
Data Analysis 
The interviews were semi-structured to allow for response consistency and 
comparative analyses (see Table 3). Following Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) method 
for coding Grounded Theory data, which “… should explain as well as describe” (p. 5), 
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the analysis followed a step-wise process. Each interview lasted approximately 15-120 
minutes, was transcribed verbatim, and analyzed in sequence as the data collection was 
completed. Additionally, field notes were transcribed the day of the interview by the 
interviewer to add to the richness of the data. During this phase, all respondents were 
given a pseudonym, and any personal identifiers (e.g., name, university, etc.) were 
changed.  
Data were analyzed using the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). A natural setting demands that a respondent act as a human instrument, which is 
grounded in characteristics such as responsiveness, adaptability, and knowledge base 
expansion to help build on tacit knowledge (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To become better 
acquainted with the data, and to develop an initial understanding of the phenomena of 
interest, the researcher reviewed field notes and transcripts. A three-step series of 
successive approximation analyses was used in order to achieve higher accuracy for 
transcripts: (1) code the data by drawing out the smallest element of understanding 
called a  “unit of data” or “incident”; (2) compare units of data and clustering them into 
sub-categories based on similarities (i.e., the researcher should try not to draw on tacit 
knowledge of the topic); (3) succinctly compare and cluster sub-categories into larger 
categories to properly address the phenomena.  
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Table 3: Interview Guide, Sample Selection, and Sample Interview Questions  
Method Informant Sample Size* Example Questions 
Interviews Athletic 
Director/ 
Associate 
Athletic 
Directors 
Three (3) Have you dealt with a whistleblowing case? 
What motivates whistleblowers? 
Do you see whistleblowing as positive or negative? 
Does someone’s organizational position dictate their 
motives? 
Would you reward a whistleblower? 
 
Interviews 
 
Compliance 
Directors/ 
Assistant 
Compliance 
Directors 
 
Five (5) 
 
What is the whistleblowing process? 
Who would you report to first in a whistleblowing case? 
Would you personally meet with a whistleblower to gather 
information? 
Do players, coaches, and managers have different motives 
for reporting or not reporting a violation?  
 
 
Interviews 
 
Faculty Athletic 
Representatives 
 
Two (2) 
 
Have you dealt with a whistleblowing case at the player, 
coach, or manager level?  
How would a player, coach, or manager be viewed within 
the organization if they blew the whistle?  
Who would be the first point of contact for a violation? 
 
 
Trustworthiness 
Prior to an interview, the researcher met, or corresponded, with the informants to 
discuss the interview protocol, obtain informed consent, and to formally explain the 
purpose of the study. At the conclusion of the interview, the interviewer “played back” 
any major, salient points given by the respondent. Several validity and reliability 
procedures were used in an attempt to ensure the trustworthiness of the study.  
Validity and Reliability 
Establishing and conveying validity and credibility in qualitative research can be 
a perplexing issue for any researcher (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Creswell and Miller 
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(2000) noted that validity, in qualitative inquiry, has been referred to as authenticity, 
goodness, adequacy, trustworthiness, plausibility, validity, validation, dependability, and 
credibility. Regardless of the semantics, it is vital that researchers establish procedures to 
verify validity within their studies.   
For this discussion, validity is defined as, “… how accurately the account 
represents participants’ realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them” 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 125). Creswell and Miller (2000) developed a two-
dimensional framework in which procedures are governed through: (a) the lens 
researchers choose to validate their studies; and (b) researcher’s paradigm assumptions. 
To assist in acknowledging researcher bias, worldview, and assumptions an aggregate of 
qualitative validity procedures (see: Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Maxwell, 1996; Merriam, 
1998) were used.  
The purpose of this study was to understand (not predict) participants’ 
whistleblowing antecedent conditions and intentions. While multiple paradigm validity 
procedures were used, due to the nature of the research consisting of multiple-case 
studies, the interpretivist (e.g., constructivist) paradigm was deemed the most 
appropriate in guiding and informing the study. The constructivist paradigm is a social 
reality construction (Searle, 1995) and it, “… recognizes the importance of the 
subjective human creation of meaning, but doesn’t reject outright some notion of 
objectivity. Pluralism, not relativism, is stressed with focus on the circular dynamic 
tension of subject and object” (Miller & Crabtree, 1999, p. 10).  
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Interpretivist (e.g., Constructivist) Paradigm Validity Procedures 
In order to draw in the reader, and have them experience the interview in as great 
detail as the researcher, the researcher needs to employ thick, rich description in the 
narrative. Denzin (1989) considers thick, rich descriptions to be “… deep, dense, 
detailed accounts,” (p. 83) used to accurately describe the setting, participants, and 
themes to further establish credibility (Creswell & Miller, 2000). A true collaboration 
between the researcher and the participant allows for such descriptions to describe each 
participant’s reality. Due to the nature of this study, there is no need for prolonged 
engagement in the field.  
Additionally, the researcher agreed with Tetlock’s (1999) approach to search for 
disconfirming evidence as a form of validity is impractical. Change is slow moving and 
preconceptions are based in a variety of belief systems, which often are not easily 
changed. Case studies may capture some disconfirming evidence but without mass 
replication there is not enough data and it only gains limited insight. In the aggregate it 
fails to support transferability.  
Postpositivist Paradigm Validity Procedures 
Triangulation is a validity procedure used through the lens of the researcher 
where there is a, “… search for convergence among multiple and different sources of 
information to form a theme or category in a study” (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 126). 
Triangulation was met by validating units of data across multiple sources (e.g., 
interviews) by multiple researchers to analyze the data allowing for better triangulation 
of the findings (Denzin, 1978). Member checking is when the researcher uses the lens of 
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the study participants as an additional validity check method. Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
considered member checks, which consist of taking data and interpretations back to the 
respondents for confirmation, to be the “… most crucial technique for establishing 
credibility” (p. 314). Each respondent was asked to check the narrative of the 
interpretations. Also, the researcher summarized themes and repeated them back to the 
respondent throughout the interview as the data was collected. Additionally, an audit 
trail was utilized by having an external scholar who has no affiliation to the study review 
the narrative, field notes, and reflexive journals of the researcher. 
Critical Theory Paradigm Validity Procedures 
Perhaps the most important validity check is establishing researcher reflexivity. 
By disclosing the paradigms used in the conceptualization of the study, the researcher is 
acknowledging interviewer assumptions, beliefs, and biases prior to analyzing the data, 
thus, the findings are likely to be more trustworthy. The research paradigm section in 
Chapter I directly acknowledged the researcher’s personal beliefs, assumptions, biases, 
and perspectives on the topic of whistleblowing to assuage concerns on trustworthiness. 
Research Context 
Respondent’s Job Descriptions 
The respondents for this study consisted of three groups of individuals in power 
positions within universities in the NCAA. Due to their position, each respondent had 
access to information of rules violations and illegal activities that may occur or perhaps 
have occurred within their respective university athletic departments. As such, these 
respondents would either be the ones reporting a violation/whistleblowing or be the 
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recipient of information from the reporter/whistleblower. For example, Athletic 
Directors are tasked with the administrative operations of running an athletic 
department. Informant Ellstin described his job as: 
I am responsible for all the daily duties, daily administrative tasks associated 
with running a Division 1, 21 sport athletic program with 80 employees and 540 
student athletes. 
Informant Tim is an Associate Athletic Director whose job responsibilities differ from 
those of Informant Ellstin, showing the differences across various levels of 
administrative roles within athletic departments:  
I am in charge of overseeing ticket sales, marketing, corporate sponsorship, 
university licensing, game day experience, and other communication instruments 
such as email, social media, website.  
Compliance Directors act as NCAA rules monitors and enforcers for their 
university’s athletic department. Informant Winona had a hard time describing her day-
to-day job responsibilities and mentioned that each day brings a different challenge. 
Informant Raylan, a Director of Compliance, depicted his job responsibilities as a policy 
and administrative position: 
It entails, really, working with the athletics department and trying to 
maintain institutional control aspects of NCAA rules and regulations ... 
institutional control could be in education, it could be in monitoring, putting 
together policy and procedures, and self-reporting violations to show that you 
have control over in the Athletics Department. 
The Assistant Compliance Director position manages all facets of student-athlete 
welfare. Informant Ava echoed Informant Boyd in their job responsibilities: 
My primary responsibilities are initial eligibility, admissions for all student 
athletes, transfer eligibility, and then waiver filing, monitoring, game day 
monitoring, recruiting monitoring and education. 
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Faculty Athletic Representatives serve as the liaison between the athletic 
department and university administration (e.g., university president). Additionally, they 
serve as the representative of their university within their affiliated conference. 
Informant Art told of how his position has changed over the past 30 years and how he 
now deals primarily with the compliance office. Informant Wynn felt that his position 
dealt more with professional development and stated: 
A lot of its professional development and understanding our job, which is student 
athlete welfare, integrity, institutional control and things that we do. 
Role of Ethics Among College Executives 
A common theme among all respondents was that each believed that in order to 
be successful in their job that they need to hold themselves to a high ethical standard. 
Ethics is defined as, “… the human concern for the degree of rightness involved in 
making intentional and voluntary choices in conduct touching on such moral values as 
justice, goodness, and truthfulness, and which carries the potential for significantly 
affecting other people” (Jensen, 1987, p. 322). Accordingly, ethics has served as an 
informing role in the decision-making process of reporting practices at the collegiate 
level while the lack of ethics has contributed to things such as institutional cover-ups. 
When a rules violation or illegal action occurs, those that have knowledge of the act are 
immediately thrust into an ethical dilemma of whether or not to report the action. The 
decision-making behavior will have a direct impact in setting the societal or 
organizational norm informing future actions. Thus, it is important that people in power 
positions be able to make unpopular decisions and sacrifices (i.e., personal and 
organizational) for the greater good of the public (Alpern, 1982).  
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Informant Ava imagined that all people believed themselves to be inherently 
good. Informant Winona noted that her ethical disposition sometimes leads her 
coworkers to dislike her: 
People don’t like me…I like to consider myself ethical and… I will report 
stuff… I try to do what’s right, let's put it that way. 
Informant Wynn, who notably was in a room alone during the phone interview, was 
unsure how to describe his ethical disposition: 
I don’t know. I’m the most ethical guy in this room right now; I know 
that…that’s the one thing I don’t ever compromise on is integrity…almost to a 
flaw. 
Informant Ellstin, however, noted that while he took pride in his ethical disposition, he 
also claimed that all human beings would categorize themselves as ethical: 
I don’t think there is a single human being on the planet that would characterize 
themselves as unethical. There’s money launders in jail that still think they are 
good people. There are drug dealers and all those that think they’re good people, 
so I’m no different.  
There was some disagreement as to whether or not the respondent’s ethical 
character always matched behavior. Informant Boyd felt that there was an important 
difference between a work environment and personal environment. He implied that the 
ethical code and rules put in place for the work position were held to a higher standard 
than that of someone’s personal life: 
In a work setting I would say so. I think you have to be kind of the same way 
all the time. I would say in everyone’s personal life there are areas where they 
might veer a little bit from how they would be at work when they’re not in a 
professional sense. I would say I might make a different ethical judgment in my 
personal life than I do at work … where everything’s cut and dry. It’s a 
violation or it isn’t, it’s right or it’s wrong, it’s yes or no. It’s much more black 
and white at work. 
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Informant Ava agreed with this assessment and admitted that her ethical character does 
not always match her behavior. Informant Tim elaborated further on this: 
I think I’m human just like everybody else. I think there’s times you got to 
take a step back and remind yourself that you’re making a mistake and try to 
learn from it everyday, but like everybody else, I’m human. I have down days 
just like everybody else and things that I wish I did differently. 
From a professional standpoint, Informant Winona felt that there is a lot of pressure on 
her position, and amongst athletic administration, to compromise their personal ethics in 
order to appease student-athletes: 
I’m not into cheating. I hate that. It irritates me. I think more people need to step 
up and I think there’s a lot of pressure on schools, professors, especially at the 
D1 level to just pass somebody. I have a huge problem with that.  
Most respondents did not feel that they ever had their morals or values 
compromised because of their position within athletics. Informant Winona claimed that 
she has never been “asked” but it was implied in conversation she should “sweep 
something under the rug.” Informant Boyd was the only respondent who maintained that 
he regularly is asked to compromise his moral values:  
I’d say coaches do that constantly. Even though it’s probably one of the least fun 
parts of the job, I can also appreciate it a little bit. They win and they recruit 
because they push people to their limits. They are going to try to push you to 
your limits to try to gain an inch, whether it’s less penalties, no penalties, 
anything. From our end, if you take the stance of no, then there's no budging 
ever, then it makes it a lot easier.  
It is important to note that the perspectives and actions of the respondents can 
help predict potential intentions of reporting/whistleblowing behavior. As a general rule, 
“… the stronger the intention to engage in a behavior, the more likely should be its 
performance” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181). All respondents held firm in being ethical at work 
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and felt that their work disposition mirrored their behavior. It is reasonable to surmise 
that when faced with a major scandal (e.g., rules violation or illegal action) that the 
respondents in power, decision-making positions will act ethically.  
Whistleblowing versus Reporting in Collegiate Sport 
Sport is an industry that has numerous governing agencies (e.g., NCAA, NFL, 
MLB, etc.) that oversee organizational mission, policymaking, membership, eligibility, 
and regulatory power. These organizations enforce rules (e.g., NCAA bylaws) and 
impose sanctions (e.g., rescinding player eligibility or banning athletes from events) for 
rules violations (e.g., gambling, cheating, academic fraud, and performance-enhancing 
drugs). Each governing agency has its own rules and regulations that guide their 
respective sport. As it relates to reporting practices and whistleblowing, professional and 
Olympic sport differs from the NCAA. Professional and Olympic sport reflects more 
traditional business methods in the dissemination and reporting practices of illegal 
activities and rules violations. The NCAA, however, has mechanisms in place that make 
the delineation of reporting and whistleblowing more muddied.  
The NCAA also differs from professional sport in that the athletes are students 
with amateur status. Goldsmith, Carroll, and Bopp (2014) argued that, “… the notion of 
amateurism has taken on an entirely new meaning; a designation that idealistically 
stresses participation rather than profession, education and opportunity…and love of the 
sport rather than financial incentives” (p. 43). As the NCAA has grown in size, so has 
the need for more rules, which have become increasingly complicated. Informant Art 
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believed that the growth of the NCAA and the subsequent expansion of the rules led to 
the need for a compliance department: 
 Everything really started changing when Proposition 48 came out. That was a 
 change in the academic requirements. We developed over the years the basic 
 philosophy that the student athletes had to earn the right to be on the field  
 through their academic progress. That started the changes from Proposition 48 on 
 through the changes that followed to where we have it now, where they have to 
 have certain percentages in order to be able to be on the field or on the court. 
 Things got more complicated. You go back 20 years, we had a compliance 
 coordinator. Now we have a compliance coordinator with a staff of 6 people 
 now. At the same time the NCAA structure has changed and more responsibility 
 has been put at the school level to see that things are run right.  
 
 Trying to distinguish reporting of violations and whistleblowing within an 
NCAA context is difficult as there is no clear-cut differentiation. The respondents 
generally agreed on some common characteristics used to separate the two. Informant 
Boyd noted that the big difference between whistleblowing and reporting a violation is 
whether it is reported internally or externally. As long as it is reported internally, he felt 
it would then be part of the reporting process that the compliance department, and the 
coaches, and athletic organization should deal with, and then eventually report the 
NCAA. However, if the report is leaked to the media, or comes from external 
stakeholders, it would then be considered whistleblowing. He also made it clear that: 
We’ve never even used the term “whistleblowing” in any meeting that we’ve 
ever had. It’s always been “reporting.” 
 
Informant Raylan tried to differentiate reporting and whistleblowing with involvement: 
 
 Reporting of a violation, to me, is, if you’re involved in it and you come up 
 and report yourself, that’s more reporting of violation; or it’s discovered in 
 the process, and as a compliance monitoring mechanism, we discover something. 
 That’s more of a reporting violation, as opposed to, "I wasn’t involved in this, 
 but I saw it go on," and to me, that’s the whistleblower. If somebody comes up 
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 and tells us, "Hey, I saw this coach doing this, and I think it might be a problem," 
 then that’s more of a whistleblower. 
 
Informant Wynn believed that within collegiate athletics reporting violations is part of 
the job responsibility for all involved:  
 Yeah, reporting a violation’s a mandate. A whistleblower, it could be one in 
 the same in a given situation ... something just might not look right and might 
 not feel right, you don’t if it’s a rule violation or not; you just want to say 
 something. Now, if you obviously know that it’s a rule violation and you say 
 something then it is whistleblowing, as well, according to my definition. 
 
Informant Winona believed that in order for the action to be whistleblowing it needed to 
be a major, or illegal, violation: 
 One’s really NCAA rules and the other one’s just well, I think ... it’s more 
 involved with I don't want to say rules but ethics, maybe it is rules. I’m not 
 sure if I’m coming clear, but it’s black and white, here’s the rule, here’s what 
 you didn’t do, we’ve got to report it, boom. That could affect your jobs most 
 times. If it’s minor, no. Something like a whistleblower, I think that term is 
 used with something that’s explosive, if you will. Huge ... like a Penn State 
 thing. You know what I mean? Like a North Carolina thing. That affects so 
 much more. So many more people. It could be somebody’s career whether 
 it’s the  whistleblower or the other people. Ruins reputations of institutions, I 
 mean a violation could too but those things happen depending on what the 
 violation is.  
 
Informant Ellstin agreed with Informant Winona that the nature of the violation dictated 
whether the action was whistleblowing or reporting: 
 I think it depends on the nature of the violation. Just because when I think 
 whistleblower, I think more of a major, large, illegal issue.  
 
 If, as Informant Ellstin and Informant Winona alluded to, the difference between 
whistleblowing and reporting is the level of egregiousness of the violation, then it is 
important to understand the difference between major and minor violations at the 
NCAA-level. Informant Boyd depicted a major infraction as: 
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 Major infraction would be ... we actually had someone from the NCAA come 
 and speak to us recently, and they said that there were, say, 120 current, 
 ongoing pieces, and over 20% of them are academic. Since my work is a lot of 
 academic work, institutions changing grades. Institutions, the North Carolina 
 case, changing grades, putting kids in fake classes, altering transcripts, 
 altering transcripts at junior colleges before they come here. That would be a 
 major infraction, anything that lacks institutional control, per se, extra 
 benefits on a large scale, money transfers, anything tangible with monetary 
 value: cars, apartment rent being paid, things like that; anything that is also 
 not a product of being one individual occurrence. 
 
Informant Boyd further explained that minor infractions were: 
 
 Minor recruiting, violation of impermissible contacts, things that were accidental. 
 We get those all the time. For instance ... some of these sound stupid but they 
 just are. A coach gets tips on their phone and butt dials a freshman in high  school 
 and can prove it, or the freshman or sophomore in high school texts the coach 
 but the coach doesn’t have their number and responds with a, "Who is this?" By 
 just responding, it’s still a violation and we still report it. 
 
Informant Loretta felt that major violations are what give the NCAA a bad reputation: 
 
 Those are definitely the worst of the worst. Right now, those kinds of 
 violations are the absolute bad actors. Where there isn’t a single violation, but 
 hundreds of violations piled on top of each other. 
 
 For the purposes of this study, whistleblowing was defined as, “... the disclosure 
by organization members, either current or former, of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate 
practices under the control of their employers to persons or organizations that may be 
able to affect action” (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 525). The person who blows the whistle 
is reporting the illegal or rules violation act, whether it is internally or externally. 
Internal whistleblowing comes from someone within the member 
institution/organization and they are reporting the act to someone in a position of power. 
External whistleblowing occurs when the act is reported to an outside source (e.g., media 
or governing body). An example of whistleblowing in a collegiate sport context is a 
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‘$100 handshake’ from a booster to a collegiate athlete, or academic fraud, where the 
illegal activity or rules violation is reported. When asked to provide an example of 
whistleblowing in the sport industry seven respondents mentioned the 2014 University 
of North Carolina academic fraud case. In addition to the UNC case, Informant Boyd 
mentioned a lesser-known academic fraud case: 
 To me, North Carolina is the most obvious one. I guess one that may be lesser 
 know, but they’re all made public, would be most recently there was an 
 instance at Adams State University and BYU ... about manipulation of 
 transcripts ... it was a coach or administrator at Adams State that was taking 
 classes for recruits all across the country and giving them credits from their 
 junior college ... with having that information, that institutional staff 
 member reported it. 
 
However, not every respondent believed we are entering into an era where there is going 
to be an increase in major rules violations or illegal practices in collegiate sport. 
Informant Ellstin felt that major rules violations within collegiate sport are no longer 
occurring with the same frequency of the past. However, he claimed that major rules 
violations are collegiate sport-specific: 
 Maybe I am naive; I think the days of a booster buying a student a car are 
 behind  us. Just because it’s so easy to catch them ... but when instances like that 
 happen, they are not doing it on the women’s soccer team, they are doing it for 
 the football star. 
 
 The respondents also had mixed opinions as to which level of sport (e.g., NCAA 
or professional) had the higher prevalence of whistleblowing behavior. Informant Ava 
leaned toward professional sport due to it being what she believed is an entertainment 
industry. Informant Boyd also felt that professional was more likely due to corporate 
structure: 
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 I would say professional, because I think that college, I mean institutions, are 
 based in large part on integrity ... professional athletics are much more 
 business-like, much more corporate. I think there’s a couple more barriers for 
 universities. 
 
Informant Raylan and Informant Ellstin feel that collegiate athletics sees higher 
prevalence in whistleblowing due more rules and regulations and a larger number of 
stakeholders: 
 I think there are more rules, regulations, guidelines and I think there are more 
 people external to the organization involved. If you are a professional 
 organization, you’ve got your team and you’ve for your ticket holders and that’s 
 about it, maybe some corporate sponsors. For us, we’ve got all those things plus 
 boosters, plus the provost office, plus the deans, plus academic advisors, plus, 
 plus, plus. There are more rules and more involvement from outside, people 
 outside the athletic department. 
 
Findings and Discussion 
This section presents the findings against the context of related research in 
whistleblowing in collegiate sport. 
RQ1: What is the perception of whistleblowing in collegiate sport? 
 The two unique themes that emerged from the data, when discussing the act of 
whistleblowing, were: (1) whether the act is moral and ethical, and (2) whether the 
whistleblowing act was considered a positive or negative.  
Whistleblowing as a Moral and Ethical Act 
 
 The perception of an organization’s ethical climate is defined by typical practices 
and procedures on issues of an ethical nature (Victor & Cullen, 1988). The 
encouragement of these practices creates a “code of ethics” within the work environment 
(Miceli & Near, 1995, p. 691). Each respondent considered whistleblowing to be a moral 
and ethical act, though some mentioned being desensitized to the magnitude and severity 
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of the rules violations or illegal behavior that is reported. For example, adhering to 
organizational policy drives Informant Tim’s ethics, and if those policies are abused then 
he felt that the ethical action is to report/whistleblow: 
 If there’s circumstances where there’s policies being broken and then there’s 
 others who know that and suppress it, then absolutely in that circumstance I 
 think it’s a positive thing to be able to do that. 
 
Informant Wynn pointed out that potential consequences of the act should not drive 
whistleblowing intention:  
 I think it’s [whistleblowing] positive. If it’s unethical, it should be reported 
 and dealt with and the consequences are what they are. If it’s unethical, at least 
 there’s some transparency there. You shed light on it, people look at it, and then 
 they realize no one should be discouraged. 
 
Informant Boyd has come to accept that unethical, illegal, and rule violating behavior 
occurs regularly while maintaining that whistleblowing on that behavior is still ethical 
but it is just harder to report: 
 You kind of assume all these terrible things are going on. To me it would be 
 harder to report because in your mind, I think you might be predisposed to 
 saying that’s the norm. 
 
Whistleblowing as a Positive or Negative Act 
 
 Within collegiate sport there is disagreement as to whether whistleblowing is a 
positive or negative act.  Each respondent was hesitant to fully commit in one direction. 
Whistleblowers, using only their own opinions and moral compass, allege that the 
reported act is for the greater good (Hersh, 2002). A whistleblower must decide whether 
the ethical or illegal wrongdoing is so egregious that it needs to be reported publically. 
Essentially, it tests a potential whistleblower’s moral and ethical conscience against their 
organizational loyalty (Jensen, 1987).  
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 Interestingly, the assumption of ‘what is good for the organization is good for the 
public’ has been frequently been debated (Jensen, 1987). A potential whistleblower has 
to decide if the right to organizational privacy outweighs the public’s right to know 
(Hersh, 2002). For example, in the New Orleans Saints whistleblowing case, some 
members of the Saints football team and coaching staff were complicit in a scheme that 
paid players to injure opponents. Each player and coach who was privy to the scheme 
had to weigh whether or not the public (e.g., the NFL and NFL fans) should be made 
aware of the unethical wrongdoing. Assume that the whistleblower made their concerns 
known internally to management and that management remedied the situation. It could 
be argued that the issue, if handled internally by the organization, did not need to be 
made public. If it were made public it could bring harsher penalties and damage the 
organizations reputation, which it did to the Saints. If the situation has been remedied, 
then the potential whistleblower would have to weigh the cost associated with making 
the issue public. The question becomes; what is more important, righting the ethical 
wrong internally but in turn there is no mention of it outside of the organization, or 
making the public aware of the ethical wrongdoing and potentially damaging the 
organization and those associated?  
 Informant Winona struggled, like many of the respondents, in fully believing that 
whistleblowing is either a positive or negative act, and noted that even when the act 
yields positive results it oftentimes brings negative collateral damage to the organization 
and whistleblower:   
 It’s a little bit of both, I would say. To me I think it’s a positive because these 
 things need to be found out. It’s a negative because it just makes a lot of people 
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 and places look bad, and it’s never a positive in terms of ... a lot of people get 
 hurt. 
 
Informant Boyd passionately provided examples of why whistleblowing is a positive act 
in keeping the athletic culture ethical in nature: 
 I think from the positive side, our goal as the compliance office, as  compliance 
 officers, in general is that when you catch things in the earliest moment and 
 immediately fix, report, investigate, change the culture of how it occurred, it’s a 
 huge positive. 
 
However, Informant Boyd also warned of the downside of whistleblowing and provided 
an example of a whistleblowing case. He pointed out that those involved in the major 
rules violation were not the ones punished and that the major fallout affected 
stakeholders that were not involved: 
 Take USC where the Reggie Bush-gate comes out. Reggie Bush had to give 
 back the [Heisman] trophy, but that was five years later, and the coach that 
 was involved with everything flees the scene and he has no punishment. The 
 people that should really be punished or held accountable for their actions can’t 
 be because they’re already gone from campus and aren’t associated. I think that 
 that’s a big negative. Since there aren’t legal ramifications, there’s no way to 
 actually punish the, for lack of a better word, criminal. A lot of the current 
 employees, current staff, and current players that have to pay the price. 
 
Most respondents showed some uneasiness in praising a whistleblower, noting that not 
all whistleblowing acts are done for positive reasons. Informant Ellstin experienced the 
downside of whistleblowing when his university was improperly involved in a 
whistleblowing case that had no merit causing a negative reaction toward the act. In turn, 
this made him weary of whistleblowing. There is now a need to know more information 
before making a judgment and ethical decision when dealing with the whistleblowing 
issue. This effectively takes up more time allowing for uneasiness for all those involved 
in the claim:  
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 The lesson that I learned from that is, if I am ever going to participate in 
 something where I am going to consider myself to be a whistleblower and come 
 forward with some information that I believe is pertinent where a university staff 
 member or group of staff members acting unscrupulously or unethically, I  better 
 be correct. I need to have my facts and I need to know what’s going on. 
 
Informant Boyd even went as far as to say that he is not sure that he would report a 
violation or whistleblow on another university. According to Bowie (1982), this type of 
behavior is not unusual as corporations often have their own sets of codes of ethics. 
Informant Boyd would mention that: 
There’s kind of an unwritten code or agreement that you work with the 
compliance office at the other university. Kind of the code is, if you’re aware of 
something ... you tend to know somebody at every school over time, at least 
enough to call them and say, "Hey, remember I met you at Denver" or 
something. You give them a call or if it’s something else you send them the 
email with the facts and here's what we found and here’s the proof behind it. 
Then ultimately, it’s that university’s job to review it.  
 
 Overall, the perception of whistleblowing was seen as a moral and ethical act 
resulting in a positive outcome. On the whole, whistleblowers were also considered 
morally and ethically motivated in reporting practices. The respondents mentioned that 
most reporting/whistleblowing has prosocial elements that ultimately right an illegal or 
unethical act. The act of whistleblowing was generally seen as positive as long as the 
whistleblower did not falsely report. There was consensus that as long as organizational 
policy was followed that there was no difference in the reporting channel (e.g., internal 
or external). There was no consensus as to which is the best or most effective way to 
report a wrongdoing, though the preferred method was internally. The major takeaway 
was that it did not matter which of a whistleblower’s antecedent conditions influenced 
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whistleblowing intention as long as there is integrity and transparency in the 
reporting/whistleblowing process. 
RQ2: What are the potential antecedent conditions that influence whistleblowing 
intention in collegiate sport? 
Respondents identified five major themes as potential whistleblowing antecedent 
conditions that influence whistleblowing intention. These include altruism, prosocial 
behavior, revenge, competitive advantage, and personal advancement. An overview of 
these antecedent conditions and their relation to existing research is presented in Table 4. 
Miceli et al. (1992a) categorized whistleblowers as having high moral character and self-
efficacy. Altruism and prosocial behavior serve as positive, ethical antecedent conditions 
for whistleblowing behavior using intentional and voluntary ethics to determine the 
degree of rightness in decision-making. However, not every motive to whistleblow is 
prosocial in nature. 
It is extremely difficult to always be morally and ethically sound, and to do the 
right thing, because there are other factors or situational factors to consider. Vickers 
(1995) separated whistleblowers into two categories: (1) watchdogs and (2) protesters. 
Watchdogs “… discover and expose wrongdoing to avoid safety or financial problems” 
while protesters, “… publicize more general problems rising from their employer’s 
activities and may therefore be politically motivated” (Hersh, 2002, p. 249). This allows 
for revenge, competitive advantage and personal advancement to serve as potential 
negative whistleblowing antecedent conditions.  
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Table 4: Definitions for Whistleblowing Antecedent Conditions 
Antecedent Informing Sources Definition 
Altruism Leeds (1963) A behavior of an unselfish act to the welfare of others that meets the following criteria:  
1. The person who engages in giving treats it 
as an end in itself. He anticipates no other 
satisfaction or gain than the pleasure of 
contributing to the welfare of others.  
2. The person gives voluntarily. He is acting 
beyond the call of duty and not fulfilling 
stipulated role obligations. 
3. On balance, the person "is doing good" as 
judged by the recipient spectators to the 
action (p. 230) 
Prosocial 
Behavior 
Dozier & Miceli 
(1985); Staub 
(1978) 
… Is positive social behavior that is intended 
to benefit other persons. But unlike altruism, 
prosocial actors can also intend to gain 
rewards for themselves (p. 825). 
Revenge Stuckless & 
Goranson (1992) 
… The infliction of harm in return for 
perceived wrong” (p. 25).  
Competitive 
Advantage 
Reed & DeFillippi 
(1978) 
… Unique position an organization develops 
vis-à-vis its competitors through its patterns 
of resource deployments (p. 90). 
Personal 
Advancement 
Boyd & Grumpert 
(1983); Burch 
(1986); Kuratko, 
Hornsby, & 
Naffziger (1997); 
White & Singletary 
(1993). 
… The process of improving your career for 
personal gain within an organization in order 
to get a more important position. 
 
 
 
Altruism 
 
 Altruism is defined as, “… a behavior of an unselfish act to the welfare of others 
that meets three criteria: (1) the act is an end in itself and is not done for self-serving 
reasons; (2) it is a voluntary act; and (3) the act results in good” (Leeds, 1963, p. 230). 
Altruism is best explained using the Theory of Planned Behavior where intention is seen 
through: (1) attitude toward the behavior (e.g., favorable ethical attitude towards 
whistleblowing to right an ethical wrongdoing), (2) subjective norms (e.g., positive 
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social pressures), and (3) perceived behavioral control (e.g., whistleblowing behavior) 
(Ajzen, 1991).  
 A recent example of a self-reported, altruistic whistleblowing behavior dealt with 
collegiate athletics. James Gundlach, an Auburn University sociology professor, 
internally reported his suspicions of academic fraud violations within his department 
(e.g., a voluntary act not done for self-serving reasons that resulted in good). Later, 
Gundlach whistleblew externally to the New York Times. He alleged that the athletic 
department was skirting NCAA requirements towards their student-athletes (New York 
Times, 2006). Gundlach claimed to report the wrongdoing simply because it was the 
right thing to do. 
 Informant Raylan, while not directly confirming that he believed in altruism, 
stated that personal ethics should serve as a motive to drive whistleblowing behavior: 
 Personal ethics, their own integrity. That’s looked upon highly at [redacted]. It’s 
 one of our core principles of the university, integrity. 
 
Informant Boyd felt that there are people who are motivated by only doing what is 
ethical: 
 There are people that just, that’s how they feel when something comes across 
 their desk or they become aware of something, you report it and that’s it. If 
 you’re doing it from a positive manner, there’s little reward other than knowing 
 that you did the right thing. 
 
Informant Wynn firmly believed in altruistic acts as a driving motive for the way to live 
life: 
 … you can do a lot of right with your altruistic compass, and just living a life like 
 that. There is a right and wrong, you should do the right thing. 
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 A person with a predisposition for altruistic behavior, has high moral character 
and moral motivation, and thus understands appropriate ethical behavior (Lee, Lee, & 
Kang, 2003). Illustrated best through the use of the Theory of Planned Behavior to 
explain intention, an altruistic person satisfies all three tenets of Leeds (1963) criteria. 
Personal ethics and integrity serve as the guiding principles in altruistic whistleblowing 
behavior.   
 Extant literature stated that altruism, based by Leeds (1963) criteria is difficult to 
adhere to. However, the respondents felt that using a personal altruistic compass to guide 
behavior should be everyone’s driving motive. In sport, individuals are more likely to be 
associated with whistleblowing if they exhibit altruistic behavior. Altruistic behavior 
influences whistleblowing intention and can serve as the overriding antecedent 
condition. 
Prosocial Behavior 
 It is extremely difficult to satisfy all three criterion of Leeds’ (1963) definition of 
altruism (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). Instead, many theorists subscribe to tenets of prosocial 
behavior. Prosocial behavior is defined as, “positive social behavior that is intended to 
benefit other persons. But unlike altruism, prosocial actors can also intend to gain 
rewards for themselves” (Dozier & Miceli, 1985, p. 825). Behavior is prosocial in theory 
if the three tenets are satisfied: “(1) a member of an organization performed the act, (2) 
the act is directed toward an individual, group, or organization, and (3) the act is 
performed with the intention of promoting welfare” (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986, p. 
711). A recent example of prosocial behavior acting as an antecedent for whistleblowing 
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behavior dealt with high school athletics. Christopher Cerbone, a high school football 
coach (e.g., a member of an organization performed the act), learned of alleged sexual 
hazing amongst some of his players, where the act was directed toward an individual, 
group, or organization. He reported the misconduct to the school principle of the 
Catholic Diocese of Sacramento and was fired a few weeks later after an investigation. 
Cerbone said that he reported the unethical acts in order to proactively correct the 
situation (e.g., the intention of promoting welfare). A court ruled in his favor and the 
diocese reached a settlement with Cerbone for $4mm. 
 Unlike altruism, the motive of prosocial behavior can result in the actor receiving 
a form of compensation or reward. In sport, that reward is oftentimes simply just the 
whistleblower getting peace of mind. Ultimately, the driving force behind the motive for 
whistleblowing behavior is a person’s code of ethics. For example, Informant Wynn and 
Informant Loretta believed that a person’s morals and ethics are involved in any form of 
whistleblowing behavior. Informant Loretta held that the motive to right the ethical 
wrong was, “to know that you’re following your own moral compass.” Informant Ava 
countered this and claimed that ethics are usually situational.  
 Informant Winona felt that a whistleblower’s reward would be:  
 I think a lot of it might be ethics. This is just not right. Let's do what’s right. This 
 is not fair, this is not right. I think it’s just maybe peace of mind. 
 
Informant Tim felt that validation for doing the right thing was a potential reward: 
 
 I think first and foremost, they feel like they’re doing the right thing. I think 
 that’s most critical. I think beyond on that, validation over time that they were 
 doing the right thing and that they feel like they’re making change for the future 
 for somebody else. I think those are really important. 
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 Prosocial behavior is the byproduct of a person who exhibits strong personal 
morals and ethics. A person who whistleblows from a prosocial standpoint promotes 
positive change in an ethical or moral manner (Vadera et al., 2009). Unlike altruism, 
prosocial behavior allows for the whistleblower to perform an internal cost-benefit 
analysis and seek reward for their actions. Brief and Motowildo’s (1986) framework for 
Organizational Commitment on Prosocial Behavior posited that persons within an 
organization perform the whistleblowing act to promote welfare. In sport, prosocial 
behavior is more likely to occur than altruism because of the cost-benefit analysis 
consideration (Dozier & Miceli, 1985).  
 Respondents noted that their own ethical compass guided them in carrying out 
their job responsibilities. However, they also acknowledged that relationship factors 
(e.g., family, perception, affiliation, and job security) were considerations in their 
reporting practices. Those considerations prompted the need for an internal cost-benefit 
analysis. Most respondents felt that the only reward a whistleblower should get is the 
self-satisfaction for performing an ethical act and positive praise from coworkers and 
superiors. In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with whistleblowing if 
they exhibit prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior influences whistleblowing intention 
and acts as the overriding antecedent condition. 
Revenge 
Revenge is defined as, “… the infliction of harm in return for perceived wrong” 
(Stuckless & Goranson, 1992, p. 25). In sport, revenge serves as a motive by the actor, 
who feels that they have been wronged, in an attempt to balance the scales of justice. 
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The best way to understand revenge as a whistleblowing antecedent is through 
Festinger’s Cognitive Dissonance Theory (1957). When an actor is trying to get a 
measure of revenge they inherently know that the action has some negative element and 
an associated negative outcome. These revenge acts cause disconnect between two 
cognitive elements (e.g., revenge as an antecedent and whistleblowing as the outcome), 
which can give the actor a sense of uneasiness. In order to get revenge the actor will 
justify the act by whistleblowing under the guise of prosocial behavior. 
 A recent example of revenge acting as a motive for whistleblowing behavior 
dealt with professional cycling. Floyd Landis, a former cycling teammate of Lance 
Armstrong, blew the whistle on Armstrong after being caught for blood doping. Landis 
admitted that he had doped at the behest of Armstrong and was angered that Armstrong 
was not being honest (e.g., justification for whistleblowing) when claiming to be clean 
of performance-enhancing drug use. Armstrong maintained that Landis only blew the 
whistle on him because his contract was not renewed by Armstrong’s cycling team (e.g., 
revenge motivation). Armstrong would later admit to the allegations and was stripped of 
his seven Tour de France victories and ordered to pay millions in restitution. 
 Informant Winona and Informant Loretta surmised that revenge serves a 
whistleblowing motivation when there is dissention in the workplace: 
 There could be tons of motivations that aren’t necessarily on the up and up. I 
 would imagine there might be others who want revenge or don’t like someone 
 and want to get them fired. 
 
 98 
 
 
Informant Wynn spoke of revenge serving as a motivation when someone who used to 
be affiliated with the university and is fired or no longer welcome within the athletic 
program:  
 I guess they got a bad deal, right? That’s clearly a motivation; retaliation the 
 other way and they’re trying to stick it to them. 
 
Informant Ava opined that, “… people who are bitter and want their chance to shine” 
use revenge as motivation. Informant Boyd looked at things from a booster or agent 
perspective and speculated that revenge acts as the antecedent condition for 
whistleblowing:  
 I think from outside of campus, if there’s a booster or someone that’s giving 
 extra benefits, they kind of have a relationship with the student athletes whether 
 they were a recruit or current student athlete. Student athletes start to go back on 
 them, the way that the booster or the permissible benefits provider expected, then 
 all of a sudden, they might have a reason to report anonymously about the kid. Or 
 if a kid wants to transfer, then you have something to harm them.  
 
 The desire to seek revenge against an opponent or former affiliate can serve as a 
powerful antecedent condition. Using whistleblowing in an attempt to get revenge 
usually means that there is an unethical, illegal, or rule violating condition that can be 
reported or exposed. Thus, there is an element of prosocial behavior that occurs as a 
byproduct of the whistleblowing act. A whistleblower may use Festinger’s Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory (1957) to justify their negative intention (e.g., revenge) because of 
the associated positive outcome (e.g., exposing the wrongdoing).  
 The respondents noted that there are many stakeholders, both internal and 
external, who potentially could use revenge as an influencing antecedent condition in 
whistleblowing behavior. In sport, individuals are more likely to be associated with 
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whistleblowing if they seek revenge. Seeking revenge situationally acts as the overriding 
antecedent condition, while prosocial behavior serves as the underpinning antecedent 
condition influencing whistleblowing intention. 
Competitive Advantage 
 Competitive Advantage is defined as the “… unique position an organization 
develops vis-à-vis its competitors through its patterns of resource deployments” (Reed & 
DeFillippi, 1990, p. 90). In order to gain an advantage on your competition the actor 
needs to have inside information on illegal, unethical, or rule violating behavior 
committed by the opposing team. Then they would need to whistleblow prior to the 
sporting event occurring in an effort to level the playing field. Using Kohlberg’s 
Cognitive Moral Development (1969), behavior is matched with actions. Level three of 
Kohlberg’s model (e.g., conformity and mutual expectations) occurs when the behavior 
of the actor takes on of the traits of close to them (Trevino, 1986). 
 A recent example of competitive advantage acting as an antecedent for 
whistleblowing behavior dealt with the NFL. Ryan Grigson, the general manager of the 
Indianapolis Colts, mirrored the behavior of team owner (e.g., conformity and mutual 
expectations), Jim Irsay, an outspoken owner who champions fair play. Grigson blew the 
whistle on the New England Patriots prior, during, and after a playoff game alleging that 
the footballs being used by the Patriots were purposefully altered and under-inflated. 
This in turn offered the Patriots team a competitive edge. By blowing the whistle, 
Grigson hoped to take away the Patriots advantage.  
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 Competitive advantage was the most common negative motive given as to why 
someone would whistleblow in sport. Superior performance is achieved as a result of 
competitive advantage (Day, 1984; Porter, 1985). Informant Rachel believed that an 
actor could whistleblow to gain a competitive advantage but that there was also an 
element of righting a wrong. Thus, competitive advantage could serve as an overriding 
antecedent condition while prosocial behavior would serve as an underpinning 
antecedent condition.  
 Informant Loretta felt that if a whistleblower perceived an advantage for the 
opposition then the motive to whistleblow would be to even the playing field as opposed 
to gaining an advantage:  
 I think it’s anything from a perceived advantage of some kind. For coaches, it’s 
 probably more about competitive fairness and competitive equity and what they 
 perceive other people are cheating. 
Informant Ava was more forceful in stating that she believed that the whistleblowing 
behavior would be vindictive allowing for revenge to act as the overriding condition and 
competitive advantage acting as the underpinning condition: 
 To hurt a program they don’t like. Hindering them in some way. Thinking that if 
 we do this, and we tell on them, we’ll get a competitive advantage to some 
 extent. 
 
A majority of the respondents felt that coaches are most likely to use competitive 
advantage as a whistleblowing motive. Informant Wynn believed that competitive 
advantage reporting was most often on the recruiting trail: 
 Competitive advantage, that’s one. Negative recruiting, for sure, then they could 
 say, "Hey, you guys cheat." If the coach gets caught doing that they can take 
 them off the list ... if they’re recruiting the same athlete, that’s a huge 
 competitive advantage that they get taken off the trail, plus it just levels the 
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 playing field. If someone else isn’t cheating, they don’t want somebody else 
 cheating. 
 
Informant Art narrowed it down to coaches’ hubris on missing out on signing a recruit: 
 You’re talking about the coaches. The motivation is they lost a student athlete to 
 the school they didn’t think they should lose it to. "I think something bad must be 
 going on, how could that kid choose that university over mine." 
 
Informant Ellstin figured that coaches’ whistleblowing on opposing coaches is 
commonplace:  
 Absolutely. It will be the coach at Tennessee calling in and turning in ... calling 
 the NCAA direct to turn in the coach at Alabama, you better believe it. I think 
 that happens darn near daily. 
 
There is a win at all costs mentality among highly competitive people (Rychman, et al., 
1990). Informant Boyd told of how coaches will strategically whistleblow in order to 
gain a competitive advantage prior to big games: 
 I know we also get a form of whistleblowing from coaches from other schools or 
 constituents from other schools where it’ll be the week before a bigger game, or 
 something like that, and something great happens to our team. All the sudden you 
 get some reports from, you know, an opposing school trying to say this, that, and 
 the other about, “so and so’s receiving this” or “so and so’s driving this car” and 
 things like that. There [are] a lot of negative motives. 
 
Informant Raylan did not limit the whistleblowing behavior to coaches. He extended the 
idea that fans, as stakeholders, would report violations if they knew it would offer their 
favorite team a competitive advantage:   
 Sure. It can be they lost out in a recruiting battle, it can be they lost out on a 
 game, and they felt like playing an ineligible player. There could be all kinds of 
 motives, but mostly it’s a competitive motive of either they lost out on 
 something, or they want to win something, and so that’s the motive, I think, of 
 the general fan out there of reporting against another school. 
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Informant Boyd posited that rivalry schools look at whistleblowing against one another 
as not only a competitive advantage but also as a reward:  
 If you’re an Alabama fan that lives in Auburn, Alabama and then you see 
 something going on with one of their student athletes or groups and you report it, 
 your reward is that your rival now will have suffered the consequences. 
 
 The desire to seek a competitive advantage against an opponent can serve as an 
effective antecedent condition, especially with highly competitive people in athletics 
who want to win at all costs (Ryckman, et al., 1990). Using whistleblowing in an attempt 
to get a competitive advantage usually means that there is an unethical, illegal, or rule 
violating condition that can be reported or exposed. Thus, there is an element of 
prosocial behavior that occurs as a byproduct of the whistleblowing act. A whistleblower 
may use Kohlberg’s Cognitive Moral Development (1969) where the coach takes on the 
traits of their peers and conforms to industry standards and expectations of needing to do 
anything to win (Trevino, 1986).  
 The respondents noted that they felt coaches use any means necessary to seek an 
advantage including reporting unethical acts and violations. Additionally, one 
respondent noted that he felt that coaches might sit on information until the optimal time 
to expose the wrongdoing as a form of competitive advantage. This leads to the 
assumption that not all whistleblowing behavior is influenced prosocially. In fact, 
whistleblowing influenced by negative antecedent conditions may consist of the 
whistleblower compromising their own personal morals and ethics by delaying the 
release of the wrongdoing until it best serves them. In sport, individuals are more likely 
to be associated with whistleblowing if they seek competitive advantage. Seeking 
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competitive advantage situationally acts as the overriding antecedent condition, while 
prosocial behavior as the underpinning antecedent condition influencing whistleblowing 
intention. 
Personal Advancement 
   The concept of personal advancement consists of advancement and financial 
gain. Personal advancement is, “… the process of improving your career for personal 
gain within an organization in order to get a more important position” (Boyd and 
Grumpert, 1983; Burch, 1986; Kuratko, Hornsby, & Naffziger, 1997; White and 
Singletary, 1993). Financial gain, a potential byproduct of personal advancement, is, “… 
the amount of money to be gained for an act or service rendered” (Miceli & Near, 1994). 
Personal advancement acts as a motive when a whistleblower uses knowledge of an 
unethical act, illegal act, or rules violation in order to advance within their employment 
or financially gain from reporting. Personal advancement is best framed using 
Attribution Theory where causal judgment of an event and a secondary event is carried 
out with an understanding of the ramifications of the first event on the second event 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The whistleblowers would understand in advance what the 
subsequent social consequences (e.g., secondary event) are prior to the act of 
whistleblowing (e.g., first event) and chooses to whistleblow anyway.  
 A recent example of competitive advantage acting as a motive for 
whistleblowing behavior dealt with USA track and field. Trevor Graham, a former USA 
track and field coach, anonymously phoned (e.g., first event) the U.S. Anti-Doping 
Agency making them aware of undetectable anabolic steroids being distributed to world-
 104 
 
 
class athletes. He then sent in a used syringe containing residue of the PED to 
authorities. This led to a federal investigation (e.g., secondary event) of Victor Conte and 
BALCO, which had been distributing steroids from 1988-2002 in one of the largest 
steroid scandals ever reported. Graham stated that he was not a part of the distribution of 
PEDs but was later sent to prison for perjury. It was later stated that Graham wanted to 
eliminate his competition and be known as the ‘mastermind of chemistry’ in providing 
illegal drugs to athletes:  
 Informant Winona spoke of a situation where someone reported rules violations 
in an effort to advance within the athletic department: 
 I think it was for personal gain. I don’t know if it was financial but I think it was 
 more for personal ... “I want to be in athletics and I want to stay in coaching.” 
 
Informant Rachel noted that coaches have intense pressure to win, which in turn helps 
their advancement within their field. She gave a scenario where a coach may decide not 
to whistleblow in order to keep a player eligible to give the team a better chance to win:  
 Maybe the coach would much prefer to have the student athlete play in the game 
 that day. They think, "Well, maybe I could always report this in a few weeks, if it 
 still seems like a problem." 
 
Informant Ellstin told of a scenario where a whistleblower was expecting to be fired and 
whistleblew on multiple violations in an effort to be protected from losing his job, and 
thus secure financial gain: 
 At the end of the day, he was playing a little bit of a game. He knew he was 
 about to get fired so he attempted to identify himself as a whistleblower and then 
 file multiple lawsuits against the university. I believe there were only a couple of 
 those things that were proven to be actually correct. He sued me, he sued the AD, 
 he sued the president, sued the vice president, sues human resources, sued 
 everybody and drug it out for almost a decade.  
 
 105 
 
 
 The desire to seek personal advancement within one’s industry can serve as a 
motivating antecedent condition, especially when financial gain is the end result of the 
advancement (Boyd & Grumpert, 1983; Burch, 1986). Using whistleblowing in an 
attempt to personally advance within an industry usually means that there is an 
unethical, illegal, or rule violating condition that can be reported or exposed. Thus, there 
is an element of prosocial behavior that occurs as a byproduct of the whistleblowing act. 
A whistleblower may use Attribution Theory where prior to whistleblowing, the 
whistleblower knows the expected social or organizational consequences of the act 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). The whistleblower can then use this information in numerous 
ways. The whistleblower could apprise the person they are informing on and use the 
knowledge as a form of blackmail. Additionally, they could use the information to report 
to someone who has the power to terminate the person who committed the wrongdoing.  
 In addition to using whistleblowing as a form of personal advancement and 
financial gain, the respondents noted that it is not uncommon for people in athletics to 
perform any act necessary in order to keep their job. All levels of athletics have a 
relatively high turnover in employment with each change in upper administration having 
trickle down effects for lesser positions. When there is a change in the organizational 
structure, the arriving administration may feel the need to replace the former 
administrations staff with people that they are more familiar with. One respondent dealt 
with a whistleblowing case where the whistleblower reported suspected violations 
merely as a means to keep his employment. In sport, individuals are more likely to be 
associated with whistleblowing if they seek personal advancement. Seeking personal 
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advancement situationally acts as the overriding antecedent condition, while prosocial 
behavior serves as the underpinning antecedent condition influencing whistleblowing 
intention.  
RQ3: What are potential benefit-to-cost differential considerations that influence 
whistleblowing intention? 
Three major themes, each with subthemes, were identified as potential barriers 
that could influence whistleblowing intention. These barriers are the contemplated 
considerations within an individual’s cost-benefit analysis. These themes include social-
situational, employment, and loyalty. Ethical judgment is related to whistleblowing 
intent; however, the action of whistleblowing is not (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 
2005). This shows that even if the potential whistleblower believes there has been a 
transgression and feel that they should report, there are considerations taken into account 
that could lead to non-reporting behavior. Thus, it is important to understand the barriers 
to whistleblowing intention. A visual map of the findings was made to as a guide to 
show types of barriers, major themes, and subthemes. Additionally, it serves to provide 
transparency of the analysis process using quotes from interviews along with 
observations from collegiate administrators (Anfara, Brown, & Mangione, 2002) (See 
Table 5).   
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Table 5: Cost-Benefit Analysis: Themes, Subthemes, and Barriers 
Subthemes Major Themes Type of Barrier 
 
Family 
Negative Perceptions  
 
 
Social-Situational 
Factors 
 
 
Personal 
 
 
Job Security 
Previous Handlings 
 
 
Employment  
Factors 
 
 
Organizational 
 
 
Organizational 
Athletes 
Fans 
 
 
Loyalty 
Factors 
 
 
Affiliation 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 When facing a decision to whistleblow, many individuals will conduct an 
internal cost-benefit analysis weighing the potential implications and consequences of 
their behavior to their work and non-work identities (Verada et al., 2009). The net 
difference between the perceived costs and expected benefits of the whistleblowing 
behavior should yield the intention outcome (Kiel et al., 2010). It is likely that 
whistleblowers will only perform the whistleblowing act if they believe that the expected 
benefits outweigh the costs (Gundlach et al., 2003).  
 Henik (2008) posited that emotion (e.g., anger, confusion, and fear) impacts 
various stages of the whistleblowing process. How stakeholders perceive a 
whistleblower impacts the decision-making process. Henik (2008) found that, “… role 
models, partners, and significant others act as organizational loyalty disruptors that 
facilitate decisions to blow the whistle altering individuals cost-benefit analysis and 
perceived value conflicts” (Vadera et al., 2009, p. 566). Affiliation (e.g., loyalty), 
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organizational (e.g., job security), and personal (e.g., family, friends, and coworkers) 
considerations all factor into a cost-benefit analysis.  
 A recent example of a whistleblower that performed a cost-benefit analysis is 
former New York Jets head coach Eric Mangini. Mangini, a former assistant coach of 
the New England Patriots, had inside knowledge that the Patriots were filming coaching 
signals from their own sideline, which is in violation of NFL rules. Mangini was a 
participant in the rules violating acts while under the Patriots employment. While he was 
employed and became aware of these actions, his cost-benefit analysis yielded the result 
of not blowing the whistle, implying that the perceived costs (e.g., being perceived as a 
snitch, potentially losing employment) did not outweigh the expected benefits (e.g., 
righting an ethical wrongdoing). However, once Mangini took a head coaching position 
with the rival Jets, he quickly sent notice to the league detailing the rules violations and 
unethical behavior. This time the expected benefits (i.e., winning the game, gaining a 
competitive advantage) outweighed the perceived costs (i.e., potentially losing trust of 
rival coaches) and his cost-benefit analysis yielded the result of blowing the whistle. 
Dubbed ‘Spy-gate’, the league fined Bill Belichek, New England’s head coach, 
$500,000, the Patriots $250,000, and stripped the team of a first round draft pick. 
However, the Jets fired Mangini a few years later and his whistleblowing behavior 
damaged his reputation around the league, thereby making it difficult to gain the trust of 
players and coaches and limiting his potential employment opportunities.  
 Nine of the informants for the study believed that a whistleblower conducts a 
cost-benefit analysis prior to their decision-making intention. Informant Ellstin felt that 
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in order to make an intelligent decision, a cost-benefit analysis needs to be performed 
but he would look for an alternative avenue to disseminate the information to avoid 
being labeled a whistleblower: 
 I think if they’re smart they do [a cost-benefit analysis]. I would look for a way 
 for the information to  become public without me being labeled the 
 whistleblower. 
 
Informant Raylan noted that only fools would report without taking the situational 
factors into consideration: 
 I think I’d be foolish to think that some don’t go through that. I think many of 
 them will probably analyze this. "Do I need to report this? Should I report this?" I 
 think that’s in everybody's nature ... do they want to put themselves in the 
 middle of something, and call someone out? 
 
Informant Wynn referenced the UNC whistleblower’s cost-benefit analysis process 
taking years before she decided to whistleblow: 
 Yeah, of course [she went through a cost-benefit analysis], because it took her 
 forever to come out ... several years later before she did.  
 
Informant Ava was the lone respondent who dissented claiming that whistleblowers are 
too caught up in the moment to think rationally:  
 I think they’re in the moment. I think usually they’re so pissed off that even if 
 they did try to weigh the pros and cons, they’ll never fully understand what could 
 potentially happen in the fallout. 
 
Informant Winona, who works for a small Division II university, claimed that the 
pressure to report compliance issues at a Division I FBS university keeps her from 
leaving her job: 
 That’s why; see it would never work at Division 1. I couldn’t do this at Division 
 1, I should say. I would not to do compliance at Division 1. 
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 There are many potential barriers associated with whistleblowing that influences 
intention outcomes. A whistleblower needs to contemplate all relevant information 
against the implications and consequences of the whistleblowing act (Verada et al., 
2009). Personal, organizational, and affiliation considerations all factor in to the cost-
benefit analysis. Personal considerations include how internal and external stakeholders 
will perceive the whistleblower. The whistleblower also needs to account for how the act 
will affect their family, friends, and coworkers. Organizationally, the whistleblower 
needs to consider how it will affect their current employment. In order to gauge how it 
will affect employment the whistleblower can refer to previous handlings by the 
organization in similar cases. A final consideration stems from the affiliation of the 
whistleblower. In order to remain loyal to an organization, to teammates, or as a fan, the 
whistleblower may decide to ignore the unethical or illegal acts. 
 Most respondents maintained that it is vital that the potential whistleblower 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis. One respondent mentioned that a person would be 
foolish to not perform one. However, respondents noted that there is no timetable for 
which to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. The cost-benefit analysis could be performed 
over an extended period of time and the considerations (e.g., barriers) within it could 
change as well. In sport, whistleblowing intention increases when the individual 
perceives the differentiation of expected benefits outweighs the perceived costs. 
Conversely, whistleblowing intention decreases when the individual perceives the 
differentiation of perceived costs outweighs the expected benefits. 
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 The aforementioned antecedent conditions (altruism, prosocial behavior, 
revenge, competitive advantage, and personal advancement) presented in RQ2 act as the 
expected benefits in a cost-benefit analysis leading to whistleblowing intention. The 
three themes (e.g., factors), and subthemes, listed below act as the perceived costs (e.g., 
barriers) dissuading whistleblowing behavior. 
Social-Situational Factors  
 The most frequently reported barrier for whistleblowing intention was social-
situational factors. The major two emerging themes recognized under social-situational 
factors were: family considerations and negative perceptions of whistleblowers. 
 Family Considerations. The whistleblower must take into consideration the 
outcomes of a whistleblowing behavior could have on their family and friends. Family, 
friends, and coworkers can all be adversely affected in a whistleblowing case (Hersh, 
2002). Informant Tim speculated that the whistleblower and those close to them become 
targets: 
 I think emotionally it’s draining on them and their family. I’m sure just like with 
 anybody else, they can lean on something and having a target on you relative to 
 being questioned on your integrity and your support of your organization can be 
 really, really hard for people. I’m sure it burns bridges with some who may feel 
 differently or see things differently and it’s really hard. I can see it being really 
 stressful for that individual. 
 
 Informant Boyd feared that fans could become aggressive towards the 
whistleblower and their family:  
 Even if you’re an external stakeholder, if you live in the community, if you live 
 in a college town, it’s certainly not only college towns, but especially in a college 
 town there’s a threat of the fanatical fans that are willing to do anything. If you 
 have children, what’s going to happen to them in school? What are you going to 
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 do now for money? What are your neighbors going to say or do? There’s a lot of 
 negative ramifications for doing it. 
 
 Negative Perceptions of Whistleblowers. How someone is perceived within their 
family, circle of friends, workplace, and community can have a major effect on the 
whistleblower (Hersh, 2002). Unfortunately, the most common perception of a 
whistleblower seems to be negative. Informant Wynn stated that the perception of the 
whistleblower depends solely on the culture. Yet, he stated that, “… the world 
whistleblower is negative, very negative.” Informant Loretta feared that being labeled a 
whistleblower would tarnish one’s reputation while Informant Winona thought that 
being a whistleblower means one’s name gets, “… dragged through the mud.” Informant 
Ava suggested that a whistleblower would gain a legacy as someone who was not loyal: 
 I think a lot of times the person who reports it is often held like in a negative 
 light. They brought down this program. Rather than, they did the right thing by 
 pointing that out. 
 
Informant Winona agreed: 
 
 I think ... not loyal. I don’t know. It depends ... again, within your department 
 they probably think you’re not loyal to your department. Maybe they think 
 you’re  not loyal to the school. 
 
Informant Boyd suggested that the whistleblower could become the university villain: 
 
 If you come forward with it and your name is attached to it and it’s not found to 
 be true, you come across as being against, you’re a negative ... even if it’s found 
 to be true, you can be found to be a villain, where you’re out to get the 
 university. I would hope that from a faculty member, they would still be viewed 
 with respect but I guess that would depend on the individual. A student, I mean, 
 they’re the villains of the entire campus at that point.  
 
Informant Ellstin succulently described the danger of being a whistleblower: 
 
 A whistleblower is a negative thing to most people. I’m identified as a 
 whistleblower and I go try get another job, I’m a boat rocker, I’m a trouble 
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 maker, all those things. I would not want to be identified as a whistleblower.
  
Employment Factors 
 The second most frequently reported barrier for whistleblowing intention was 
employment factors. Two subthemes were recognized under employment factors: (1) job 
security and (2) previous handling of whistleblowing cases. 
 Job Security. All the respondents at various points in the interviews mentioned 
job security as a major consideration acting as a barrier to whistleblowing behavior. 
While laws are in place to protect certain whistleblowers, the reality is that in sport those 
protections offer little comfort. Hersh (2002) remarked how whistleblowers faced “… 
more close monitoring by supervisors, negative performance evaluations, being ignored 
by co- workers, and losing their job or being forced to retire” (p. 250). Informant Loretta 
and Informant Winona mentioned future employment and current job security as 
considerations. Informant Winona also predicted that, “… if it’s a coach, [they] may not 
get a job at a different institution.”  
Informant Ellstin admitted hesitation in hiring a whistleblower:  
 It’s almost akin to filing lawsuits, so if I’m hiring somebody, let’s say I’m hiring 
 a new director of sports medicine, and in my quick Google research, Yahoo 
 research, whatever, I find out that they have a lawsuit pending against their 
 current employer. Honestly, I am probably not employing them even though that 
 lawsuit may have complete merit and validity, because that concerns me. It 
 would be the same with a whistleblower. 
 
Informant Boyd noted that the whistleblower isn’t just putting their own job in jeopardy 
but also potentially those that they work with:  
 Certainly the negative is, whether it’s right or wrong, after whistleblowing occurs 
 and it’s found to be true, a lot of people now, their careers are crushed. 
 Specifically, head compliance officers [are] likely to lose their job if there’s 
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 anything going on, whether they had a reasonable opportunity to prevent it or 
 not. If it’s academic based a lot of academic counselors from the athletic side 
 could lose their job. The campus counselors could lose their job. That person that 
 blows the whistle could either lose their job, certainly I would doubt if they’d 
 legally be able to be fired for that, but they certainly could be asked to resign 
 with some kind of package because of their requiring to be removed from that 
 community. 
 
Informant Boyd thought that managers who whistleblow are put in the most difficult 
situation: 
 A manager on the team ... put in a harder position because anything that they 
 report is going to be viewed as breaking trust or not being part of the team with 
 the coaches that they work for.  
 
Informant Art believed that a student-athlete who blows the whistle would have a hard 
time keeping their scholarship: 
 There are all kinds of barriers for people within athletics that are vulnerable to 
 being put off the team or scholarship not renewed and things like that, yes. There 
 are things there. 
 
Informant Wynn and Informant Winona both mentioned the UNC whistleblowing case 
and the effect that it had on the whistleblower. Informant Wynn noted that the 
whistleblower’s reputation is tainted in addition to losing her job: 
 She doesn’t work there anymore, besides losing your job ... that’s the culture that 
 we have set up or they have set up, not in my department, but yeah, obviously, 
 the fear is retaliation … I mean, they smeared that woman’s reputation.    
 
Informant Winona felt sympathy for and commended the UNC whistleblower who faced 
the stark reality that once you blow the whistle your life will invariably change: 
 I give this person a lot of credit for doing that and probably she will probably be 
 more affected than the athletic department or any of those people that were 
 involved there, which is sad. You know what I mean? I’m in the industry, I’m in 
 the business, but that’s my opinion. 
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 Previous Handling of Whistleblowing Cases. The willingness of others to 
whistleblow in the future depends on the culture set forth by previous perceived 
experiences (Hersh, 2002). The climate that is established in handling reporting practices 
and whistleblowing sets the tone for employee’s behavior. If the organization is 
proactive and rewards, not punishes, the whistleblower there is a higher likelihood of the 
reporting behavior. Subsequently, if the work environment chides at reporting practices, 
then whistleblowing behavior will likely decrease.  
 If an organization sets a precedent of questionable practices, it gives an 
indication that retaliation may occur against whistleblowers (Near et al., 1986). 
Informant Raylan pointed to a work environment that lauded reporting:  
 Concern or pressures that they maybe face in their job of how things have been 
 handled within their area when something’s been done in the past, as far as 
 turning in small or large issues, and how their supervisors have handled it in the 
 past. Those are likely some barriers that people might face. 
 
Informant Boyd surmised that if the environment is pressure packed and results oriented 
and someone throws off the balance by whistleblowing that there could be internal 
backlash: 
 There can be pressure from colleagues. If you’re a faculty member in an 
 academic department and you report it, what happens if six other people in the 
 department knew about it? Not only are they upset with you because they 
 probably feel that you didn’t need to do it, but now their jobs are on the line 
 because it could come out that they previously knew.  
 
Loyalty Factors  
 Affiliation plays a strong role in whistleblowing intention (Vadera, Aguilera, & 
Caza, 2009). Jensen (1987) and Judd (1999) both considered whistleblowers to have 
multiple loyalties, which include organizational loyalty, family, friends, teammates, and 
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the greater public. Each play a role on the ethical dilemma in the decision-making 
process of whistleblowing intention (Hersh, 2002). While the least reported barriers for a 
whistleblowing intention were affiliation factors, three subthemes were recognized under 
affiliation: (1) organizational affiliation, (2) athlete affiliation, and (3) fan affiliation. 
Accordingly, strong attachment to the organizational affiliation can act as a mediating 
variable in whistleblowing intention. As a barrier, affiliation at the organizational-, fan-, 
and athlete-levels has a strong influence on behavior. Basically, the actor could deem the 
wrongdoing acceptable or not worthy of reporting during the time they work for the 
organization out of perceived loyalty.  
 Organizational Affiliation. Organizational affiliation is limited to those who are 
internal stakeholders and have a direct connection to the athletic program. Winfield 
(1994) felt that employees should resign if they felt their ethical concerns overrides their 
duty to the organization. Informant Wynn claimed that internal stakeholders, even if 
their job is to remain ethical and unbiased, allow affiliation to super cede and influence 
intention:  
 Even internal, man, some of these guys drink the Kool-Aid. They may not even 
 know that they’re drinking the Kool-Aid and that they don’t see things a certain 
 way, but they’re biased. You just say, "Oh, that’s fine, we’re great." No, man, 
 you’re looking at it through clouded lenses. 
 
Informant Boyd suggested that affiliation is the only thing that keeps people from 
blowing the whistle: 
 If you have no affiliation with the university or organization, then what would 
 ever keep you from reporting something or coming forward with anything?   
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However, Informant Raylan felt the opposite and stated that the more involved one is 
with the university, the more likely they are to whistleblow: 
 I’d say as a determining factor, if they’re more involved with the institution, then 
 they’re more likely to blow the whistle, I believe. Yeah, they’re more involved 
 and more invested, and I’d say more involved and more invested, and it’s like 
 they have a personal stake in this thing. They have a pride in [redacted], and the 
 integrity, and the ethics, and that institution succeeding, so they have an 
 investment for the right reasons, and so they’re more apt to say, "No, when we 
 win, I want to win it the right way and not have any of these problems."  
 
 Athlete Affiliation. Athletes who participate in team sports typically feel 
camaraderie with teammates strengthening the bond of affiliation. If an athlete were to 
whistleblow they could face extreme backlash for their actions within the locker room. 
Loyalty can dissuade a whistleblower from reporting the unethical or illegal act (Miceli 
& Near, 1986) in order to not be considered disloyal (Duska, 2007). Informant Raylan 
imagined that it would be hard for an athlete to violate the trust of the team: 
It’d be very hard for that student-athlete to come forward, and if they knew it is 
 at such a level that it’s going to jeopardize their remaining season, the 
 employment of a coach that may be very liked. 
 
Informant Boyd assumed that there would be anger from the team leading to alienation: 
 I would think that there would be a lot of internal turmoil, anger, negativity 
 towards the whistleblower. From the player side, you’re breaking away from the 
 team. That’s what the model constantly is in college athletics. We’re a team. 
 Don’t let outside forces in. If you were to veer from the team to get the coach in 
 trouble, another player in trouble, anything like that, I mean, you’re going to be 
 outcast.  
 
Informant Winona described how the teammate could be treated: 
 You could be shunned by teammates, by coaches, by classmates, by peers, by 
 people you work with. 
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Informant Ava said that the athlete would be known as a “snitch” instead of 
whistleblower, while Informant Boyd pontificated on the next steps an athlete would 
take if they were to whistleblow: 
 I could see it being a situation where the player feels like they need to transfer 
 because there’s just not a level of trust. From a coach and team perspective, 
 anyone that’s doing something to hurt the team is going to be chastised, directly 
 or indirectly punished for it. 
 
 Fan Affiliation. Fans are as invested as any stakeholder but for entirely different 
reasoning. Fans are external stakeholders who use sport as entertainment as opposed to 
employment. Fans are consumers with high levels of identification with a sport team 
(e.g., professional) or university (e.g., collegiate). In turn they exhibit high levels of 
emotional and affective attachment (Goldsmith & Walker, 2014; Lock & Filo, 2012; 
Zagacki & Grano, 2005). For example, Informant Ava felt that fans are less likely to 
whistleblow against their own university because they are competitive. However, 
Informant Art thought fan affiliation played a key role in whistleblowing intention: 
 I suspect less likely [to blow whistle against own university]. I think the emotion 
 carries a day with a lot of the people who are not directly involved with the 
 university but that’s just my gut feeling. 
 
Informant Wynn predicted that fans, due to their affiliation, are more likely to blow the 
whistle against a rival:  
 I mean people are loyal and they’re more likely to whistleblow against a rival or 
 an opposing opponent than they are their own institution. 
 
Informant Boyd said that based on affiliation, fans are willing to not blow the whistle 
against their own team in order to win.  
 Sadly, I would say the majority of fans or students on campus may have the 
 perception of, "I don’t care, I just want to win games," and if a student, or a 
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 faculty member, or a staff member, or anyone internally does something to 
 negatively affect whatever team, then even though they did nothing wrong, 
 they’re going to be viewed as the bad person, not the student athlete.   
 
 Even with the most stout ethical and moral compass and influencing antecedent 
conditions, barriers still exist that can dissuade whistleblowing intention. There are a 
number of retaliatory acts that deter whistleblowing such as “… organizational steps 
taken to undermine the complaint process, isolation of the whistleblower, character 
defamation, imposition of hardship or disgrace upon the whistleblower, exclusion from 
meetings, elimination of perquisites, and other forms of discrimination or harassment” 
(Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, p. 285). Whistleblowers need to take into 
account social-situational, employment, and loyalty factors.  
 The family, friends, and coworkers will be affected after the whistle is blown. 
One respondent thought that the entire process would be draining on a family while 
another commented that that it could affect the community. Additionally, internal and 
external stakeholders invariably will view the whistleblower differently. One respondent 
predicted that the whistleblower would be viewed as the person who brought down a 
program, effectively becoming a villain. The whistleblower should consider their current 
and future employment and can do so based on previous handlings of whistleblowing 
cases. One respondent admitted that he would probably not consider hiring a 
whistleblower. Lastly, the whistleblower likely will consider what role loyalty has on 
their whistleblowing intention. Affiliation has a strong effect on whether or not someone 
would blow the whistle. One respondent went as far as to claim that affiliation is the 
determining factor in whistleblowing intention. Regardless of the barriers, the 
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whistleblower will blow the whistle if they feel the expected benefits outweighs 
perceived costs but not without serious considerations as to what affect those perceived 
costs would have on their personal lives, their position within an organization, and how 
it affects their affiliation.  
Limitations 
There were several limitations to the current study. Assuaging these issues in the 
future will improve research inquiry in this particular area. First, the general issue with 
all whistleblowing cases centers on actual versus hypothetical cases. It is uncommon for 
a whistleblower to detail their experiences before, during, and after the whistleblowing 
process. There is a timeline change after the fallout of a whistleblowing case with 
hindsight always being 20/20. As a result, whistleblower experiences may change during 
each phase of the whistleblowing process and change even further years after the case is 
resolved. If the whistleblower is interviewed during one phase and was treated positively 
then they will report one perception. However, if their coworkers later treated them 
differently, their responses may be quite different.  
It is likely that there is little consistency throughout the process. There is a 
danger of the whistleblower fictionalizing the events as well, including the initial 
antecedent conditions for whistleblowing and the factors involved (Hersh, 2002). As a 
result, the closest researchers can get to answers is through the shared experiences of 
whistleblowers and by putting respondents through hypothetical whistleblowing cases. 
Yet, even hypothetical scenarios do not prepare a respondent from the ever-changing 
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variables that influence real-life behavior making it difficult to discern what findings are 
factual while in a laboratory setting (Miceli, et al., 1992). 
It is uncommon to have access to a whistleblower during their entire experience 
and longevity studies are difficult to conduct with whistleblowing. To assuage these 
concerns, and enhance the findings, it has been suggested to study non-whistleblowers 
(Dozier et al., 1985). Due to the lack of whistleblowers available to speak within a sport 
setting, interviewing respondents in an athletic department position was deemed optimal. 
The respondents were in power positions and were privy to all reporting and 
whistleblowing occurrences within their institution. Interviewing these respondents was 
deemed the most appropriate way to inquire about the perception of whistleblowing, the 
perception of whistleblowers, to understand possible antecedents to whistleblowing 
intention, and identify the potential barriers of whistleblowing intentions.  
A second limitation dealt with data collection. There is a culture of secrecy in 
sport where whistleblowing and the reporting of illegal, immoral, and unethical acts and 
rules violations are taboo. University lawyers and/or coworkers advised more than 40 
potential respondents to decline speaking on and/or off record because whistleblowing 
was the interview topic. This is an issue with all whistleblowing research where response 
rates for surveys are extremely low (Barnett, Cochran, & Taylor, 1993). Some 
respondents felt that the interview questions may be too invasive for elaborate answers 
to be given. Three respondents made it known at various points in the interview to 
remind the researcher that they needed to be careful with their answers and asked that 
any personal identifiers and university affiliation be redacted from the transcripts and 
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manuscript. The only way to remedy this would be to find university athletic officials 
who are willing to be transparent. 
A third limitation was that none of the respondents were actually whistleblowers 
themselves. However, one respondent was directly involved in a whistleblowing case 
and was able to adequately explain the process. All of the respondents have dealt with 
reporting practices as part of their job. There was some initial confusion on the 
difference between the terms whistleblowing and reporting at the NCAA-level. Many 
respondents asked for a clear definition of whistleblowing and then later would self-
categorize the different types of NCAA violations (e.g., major and minor) as a way to 
separate the competing terms. Additionally, many respondents were reticent to speak 
specifically on past whistleblowing cases because of their lack of knowledge on the case. 
Instead, they wanted to speak purely in their dealings with whistleblowing/reporting. 
When the respondents had no direct relations with an aspect of whistleblowing they 
asked to speak in hypotheticals only. However, many respondents pointed out that since 
they have never been in the actual situation, they were merely predicting what their 
behavior would be. As such, interviewer selection bias and the potential findings may 
have occurred unknowingly (Miceli et al., 1992a). To this end, the researcher 
recommends that more interviews be conducted with similar positioned respondents who 
have experience with a whistleblowing case. 
A fourth limitation dealt with whistleblowing antecedents in a sport setting. First, 
it is important to note the antecedent conditions to commit a violation are very different 
than the antecedent conditions for reporting one. The negative antecedents typically 
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directly relate to the person(s) or organization(s) that wronged the whistleblower prior to 
the whistleblowing act being carried out. Additionally, the antecedent conditions of the 
actor may not be explicitly stated as their motive. Whistleblowers are typically 
characterized as highly moral and ethical giving off the impression that the 
whistleblowing action was done with prosocial intention (Miceli, et al., 1992a). 
However, the true motivation can only be gleaned through the details of the 
whistleblower, the scenario, and history between the whistleblower and those who were 
reported. Unfortunately, very few whistleblowers directly state their true reasoning for 
blowing the whistle leading to the assumption that prosocial behavior serves as the 
motive.  
A fifth, and final, limitation is that there are transferability issues. A multiple-
case study method is a great tool for inquiry and initial investigation (Hersh, 2002). 
However, while the relatively small sample size is adequate for a qualitative study, the 
findings are in many ways too isolated to the experiences of the respondents and are 
unable to be transferred across a population. The perspectives and themes also may be 
solely dependent on the researcher, thus limiting the findings to only one interpretation 
(Elliston, Keenan, Lockhart, & Van Schaick, 1985). Also, respondents were limited only 
to collegiate sport. To mitigate these concerns there is a need to empirically test the 
propositions, conceptual model, and for cost-benefit analysis. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 “There are many unresolved questions about the factors that encourage and 
impede whistleblowing, organizational responses, and the legal and other measures 
required to fully protect both whistleblowers and the subjects of unsubstantiated 
allegations” (Hersh, 2002, p. 260). The goal of this dissertation was to help answer some 
of the unresolved questions about the factors that Hersh (2002) alludes to in a sport-
centric context. There is very little whistleblowing literature using sport as a context yet 
there has been an increase in publicized scandal in sport stemming from whistleblowing 
behavior. In Study 1, a sport whistleblowing model was conceptualized, stemming from 
an extended general management whistleblowing literature review and whistleblowing 
in sport content analysis. Findings established possible antecedents and cost-benefit 
analysis barriers. In study 2, interviews were conducted with collegiate administrators to 
investigate the perception of whistleblowing behavior and whistleblowers. The 
secondary goal of study 2 was to further establish possible sport whistleblowing 
antecedents, cost-benefit analysis barriers, and affiliation factors to be empirically tested 
in future studies. Lastly, the researcher was able to probe how ethical and moral 
character relates to whistleblowing.  
 Cunningham asserted that, “… the best theories are the ones that help people 
make sense of the world around them” (2013, p. 2). Thus, in order to better predict and 
understand phenomena the primary purpose of theory is to provide an insightful 
explanation of the relationship of how things work and why. French writer and poet, 
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Antoine de Saint Exupéry, said that a “goal without a plan is just a wish”. Similarly, 
research without good theory is just an opinion. Doherty explained that, “… theory is the 
foundation of efforts to generate new knowledge and understanding of phenomena” and 
that “… scholars need to explain and predict, and ultimately to control” (2013, p. 7). 
Fink (2013) noted that theory needs to be insightful and that there is no one singular 
theory that can explain all phenomena’s. Therefore, context is imperative. Mintzberg 
commented on the evolution of theory stating, “… a good theory is one that holds 
together long enough to get you to a better theory” (2005, p. 365). 
 Chelladurai (2013) noted that in the early years of sport management there was 
no consensus among scholars of how the field would be defined and what aspects of 
sport would fall under the proverbial umbrella. I believe we are just now starting to exit 
our infancy phase and are beginning to move forward as a mature, stand-alone 
discipline. In order to do so, however, we must start create what Corley and Gioia called 
“scholarly currency” (2011, p. 12). Cunningham implored that we use the uniqueness of 
sport to further define our discipline (2013, p. 3). As support, Doherty stated, “… the 
strength of an academic discipline is its distinct body of knowledge that is not covered 
by another discipline” (2013, p. 5). 
In order for the field of Sport Management to continue to grow and develop as a 
stand-alone discipline it is vital that we unearth distinct bodies of knowledge to separate 
us from other disciplines (Doherty, 2013). Studies conducted from multiple paradigms 
are needed to be to shape our research (Frisby, 2005). In 1996, Slack reported in his 
“Zeigler” writing that 65% of sport management articles were based in physical 
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education research. In the fifteen years that have followed one might think the sport 
management field only dealt with college athletics and professional sports (Pitts, 2001). 
As sport management researchers, there is an overwhelming need to justify our place 
within the social sciences by focusing too much on the positive aspects of sport to 
highlight that sport is unique to the extent and that much of the sport research glorifies 
sport (Frisby, 2005). At the same time we also are hypercritical attacking social ills (e.g., 
greed, corruption, racism, sexism) exacerbated by sport (Frisby, 2005). Chalip (2006) 
offered that an advantage to sport management being a young discipline is that scholars 
are able to build the foundation and shape its future (p. 1). By developing a unified 
model for whistleblowing, and applying a cost-benefit paradigm, the proposed model is 
the first attempt to collectively interpret and classify the antecedent conditions for 
whistleblowing in sport. Chalip’s (2006) sport-focused model, “… calls for researchers 
to be inspired to search for theory grounded in sport phenomena with an objective to 
create new theory to contribute to the sport management practice” (p. 3). 
Notwithstanding the novelty of the research and the timeliness of the endeavor, the 
contribution of a new model that differs from borrowed business theories, or as Chalip 
(2006) would call them ‘home disciplines’, will contribute to the body of knowledge in 
Sport Management.  
While some theory within this dissertation is borrowed from existing knowledge 
of the ‘home disciplines,’ this conceptual article serves as a first attempt to explain 
whistleblowing in a sport context. This whistleblowing work will help advance ethical 
theory in sport from infancy to a mature stand-alone area with a sport-specific 
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framework. Furthermore, antecedent conditions for whistleblowing in sport are 
presented as different from mainstream business and offer a salient new way to 
understand the practice.  
 Finally, practitioners will gain valuable insight into the perceptions of sport 
whistleblowers from a variety of viewpoints and multiple organizational contexts. In 
sport, there are issues with bribes, performance-enhancing drugs, academic fraud, etc. 
where it is beneficial to be proactive and get out in front of the story. Being proactive 
will in turn minimize damage, save more jobs, and save universities more hassle than if 
they were reactive. UNC seemed to be a bit reactive while Penn State was absolutely 
reactive. You do not hear about some other universities who have had similar issues 
because they were more proactive.  
 Informant Raylan agreed and noted that schools who are proactive, self-police, 
and self-impose penalties are the ones who are benefitting most and being perceived as 
ethical: 
 Yeah, absolutely. You look at schools that, they have a whole lot of secondary 
 infractions, and they’re being proactive and self-policing themselves, and that 
 shows that their systems are engaged, and they’re functioning, they’re 
 discovering these problems, and that hopefully avoids major ones. It’s not saying 
 they’re discovering everything that’s out there, because you can always have a 
 rogue student-athlete, a rogue booster, a rogue coach, a rogue ... all kinds of 
 people, and they can sell it, the best of them. 
 
 Informant Wynn and Informant Raylan both work for universities that have 
hotlines to report rules violations and unethical behavior of coaches and student-athletes. 
Informant Wynn touted his university’s hotline: 
 I told you we have that hotline. In our field of athletics, the coaches often tell on 
 each other. They’ll see someone out recruiting and all of a sudden there’s a 
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 picture taken of that coach that’s unapproved, that aren’t supposed to be talking 
 you underage, or she’s underage. I’ve seen these, actual photos of someone, so 
 some other university turning them in. That’s more for different reason; they’re 
 trying to eliminate the competitive advantage; stick it to the competitor.    
 
Informant Raylan felt that more universities should have these reporting systems, as it 
would help crack down on unethical and rules violating behavior while also protecting 
the whistleblower.  
 We have the benefit of doing things anonymously here, as well, through 
 [redacted] and stuff, so you only had to put yourself in the middle of it; you can 
 just call your attention to it, and we wouldn’t know who that whistleblower was. 
 Somebody blew the whistle, and we had to look into it. 
 
Future Research 
 
This qualitative inquiry is the first step in a research agenda that will investigate 
and test the conceptual model of whistleblowing in sport. Antecedents, in addition to 
numerous social psychological theories have been applied to the whistleblowing 
phenomenon in the literature. However, many of these theories have yet to be tested 
empirically (Hersh, 2002). There is also a need to test how personality traits and the 
severity of the wrongdoing influence whistleblowing intention (Hersh, 2002; Miethe, 
1994). As such, a subsequent quantitative study will consist of using cross-sectional, 
self-reported surveys in a sport setting. Plans to pilot test the antecedent conditions of the 
conceptual model, and establish content validity, will consist of participants in both the 
collegiate (e.g., Athletic Directions, Compliance Directors, and Faculty Athletic 
Representatives) and professional ranks (e.g., coaches, athletes, and front office 
executives). Each participant will be given a survey with two scenarios (e.g., NCAA 
minor and major violations) and asked to rate the severity of the violation and indicate 
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whether or not they would report a violation internally, to the compliance director, or 
externally, to the NCAA or media. Additionally, the respondents will be asked to 
complete a survey to assess personality characteristics. Lastly, the respondents will be 
primed with three negative vignettes as precursors to the same two aforementioned 
scenarios to assess if their intention to report the violation is altered. If feasible, 
collecting real world data through an experimental design would be optimal. 
As there are many stakeholders in sport, a multi-dimensional approach, 
identifying both potential internal and external whistleblowers in a sport-centric setting, 
will be tested to see if the whistleblowing outcomes are correlated between the groups. 
Additionally, in order to understand the relationships of whistleblowing antecedent 
conditions and whistleblowing intention, a quantitative approach is appropriate to 
examine the role antecedent conditions play in the whistleblowing intention in sport. 
Further, a quantitative approach will test for the role that perceived severity of rules 
violations or unethical acts have on whistleblowing intention in sport. Lastly, testing will 
be done to examine how perceived severity of how rules violation or unethical acts 
influence likelihood of internal and/or external reporting practices of whistleblowing 
intention in sport. This research method will allow for testing of hypotheses on the 
relationship between antecedent conditions and whistleblowing intentions. 
There has been a lack of research on loyalty and affiliation as factors in 
whistleblowing (Miceli, et al., 1992a). These studies will allow for future testing of 
various aspects of whistleblowing in sport including cost benefit analysis, affiliation, and 
situational ethics. Some studies include testing whistleblower stakeholder perceptions 
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via a quasi-experimental design, a mixed-method study on fan (external) and athletic 
department (internal) whistleblowing practices, testing the whistleblowing model with 
SEM/CFA, and using the SRFPS Model for ethical decision making in whistleblowing 
practices.  
Conclusions  
 
The results of this research have bolstered sport-specific theory on ethical 
decision-making while also contributing to our understanding of the whistleblowing 
phenomenon in sport. These findings will allow future researchers to: (1) understand the 
perception of whistleblowing in sport, (2) better understand the antecedent conditions 
that underpin a whistleblowing intention, (3) gain insight into the role that antecedent 
conditions play in the whistleblowing intention in sport, (4) understand the potential 
benefit-to-cost differential considerations that influence whistleblowing intention, and 
(5) understand how one’s affiliation with an organization influences the intention to 
whistleblow.  
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APPENDIX A 
WHISTLEBLOWING INQUIRY CONSENT FORM 
Project Title: Whistleblowing and Violations Reporting Inquiry 
You are invited to take part in a research study being conducted by Andrew 
Goldsmith, a researcher from Texas A&M University. The information in this form 
is provided to help you decide whether or not to take part. If you decide you do not 
want to participate, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not lose any 
benefits you normally would have. 
Why Is This Study Being Done? 
The purpose of this study is to bridge the gap in literature within sport and reporting 
violations (whistleblowing) to contribute a stand-alone, sport-specific research focus 
moving away from borrowed theory of other disciplines. Influenced by the foregoing, 
and the lack of research on this topic in sport, the purpose of this study is to develop a 
unified model for whistleblowing motives in sport and provide several testable 
propositions for future researchers to consider. 
Why Am I Being Asked To Be In This Study?  
You are being asked to be in this study because you belong to the target population.  
How Many People Will Be Asked To Be In This Study? 
15 people (participants) will be invited to participate in this study locally. Overall, a total 
of 45 people will be invited. 
What Are the Alternatives to being in this study?  
The alternative to being in the study is not to participate. 
What Will I Be Asked To Do In This Study? 
You will be interviewed by the principal investigator about your knowledge of reporting 
violations (whistleblowing) in sport. Your participation in this study will last from 35-60 
minutes. 
Are There Any Risks To Me? 
The things that you will be doing are no greater than risks than you would come across 
in everyday life. There will be no risks, including physical, criminal, social, financial, 
economic, and psychological. There are minimal risks associated with breach of privacy 
or confidentiality. Although the researchers have tried to avoid risks, you may feel that 
some questions/procedures that are asked of you will be stressful or upsetting. You do 
not have to answer anything you do not want to. 
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Will There Be Any Costs To Me?  
Aside from your time, there are no costs for taking part in the study. 
Will I Be Paid To Be In This Study? 
You will not be paid for being in this study. 
Will Information From This Study Be Kept Private? 
The records of this study will be kept private.  No identifiers linking you to this study 
will be included in any sort of report that might be published.  Research records will be 
stored securely and only Andrew Goldsmith will have access to the records. 
Information about you will be stored in computer files protected with a password. 
Information about you will be kept confidential to the extent permitted or required by 
law. People who have access to your information include the Principal Investigator and 
research study personnel.  Representatives of regulatory agencies such as the Office of 
Human Research Protections (OHRP) and entities such as the Texas A&M University 
Human Subjects Protection Program may access your records to make sure the study is 
being run correctly and that information is collected properly.  
Audio Recordings 
Since audio recordings are optional, participants must consent to audio recordings or 
decline but still consent to participation in the interview. Please initial your choice 
below: 
________ I give my permission for [photographs/audio/video recordings] to be made of 
me during my participation in this research study. 
________ I do not give my permission for [photographs/audio/video recordings] to be 
made of me during my participation in this research study. 
Who may I Contact for More Information? 
You may contact the Protocol Director, Andrew Goldsmith to tell him/her about a 
concern or complaint about this research at 484-894-7026 or 
andrew.goldsmith@hlkn.tamu.edu. You may also contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. 
Matthew Walker at 850-491-4446 or matt.walker@hlkn.tamu.edu. 
For questions about your rights as a research participant; or if you have questions, 
complaints, or concerns about the research, you may call the Texas A&M University 
Human Subjects Protection Program office at (979) 458-4067 or irb@tamu.edu.  
What if I Change My Mind About Participating? 
This research is voluntary and you have the choice whether or not to be in this research study.  
You may decide to not begin or to stop participating at any time.   If you choose not to be in 
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this study or stop being in the study, there will be no effect on your relationship with Texas 
A&M University. 
Any new information discovered about the research will be provided to you. This information 
could affect your willingness to continue your participation. 
By participating in the interview(s) you are giving permission for the investigator to use 
your information for research purposes. 
Thank you. 
Andrew Goldsmith 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Whistleblowing Inquiry Interview Protocol  
Interview Guide, Sample Selection, and Interview Questions 
*Note: Please be honest with your answers. If you are uncomfortable answering any question, please inform me and
we can move on. 
1. What is your official job title?
a. What kinds of work do you do?
b. How long have you been in this current position? In the field?
c. Describe to me what a normal workday entails.
d. Describe to me your current university and how it relates to NCAA 
sports.
e. If you have worked at other universities, can you tell me the similarities 
and differences as it relates you your job and reporting practices?
2. Who do you interact with on a daily basis for this work? What kinds of people?
In what areas?
a. Do you ever come into contact with university boosters/donors?
3. Walk me through a scenario where you needed to report an NCAA violation?
a. Who do you report to first?
b. Do you trust that once you report to a higher-up that your reporting will 
be carried out?
c. Do you have a follow up procedure?
4. How does the type of violation effect your reporting?
a. What do you consider a minor/secondary infraction? Typical penalty?
b. Major infraction? Typical penalty? (level 1,2,3,4 system)
5. How do you feel the size of the university affects reporting of violations?
a. Have you ever faced pressure to ignore a violation? By whom?
i. How do you feel the type of sport dictates reporting?
6. Do you know what whistleblowing is? (if no, I will explain it)
DISSERTATION MATERIALS
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a. If yes, can you give me an example of whistleblowing in the sport
industry?
b. Is there a difference in your mind between reporting a violation and
whistleblowing? If so, what is the difference?
c. If you reported a violation internally but were blocked by members of
your institution from seeing your report go through, would you externally
report? Why or why not?
i. Does the type of violation dictate your intention to whistleblow?
7. Have you dealt with a whistleblowing case?
a. Can you describe the university or NCAA protocol and policies from start
to finish?
b. What kinds of the resources do you have available to you in the event of a
whistleblowing occurrence?
i. Were you made aware of United States whistleblowing laws
during your hiring process of your university or by the NCAA?
8. Who would you report to first in a whistleblowing case?
a. Is there a clear chain of command? Explain the chain of command and the
reasoning behind it. If no chain of command, why is there not one?
b. Would you personally meet with a whistleblower (lead) to gather
information? If no, who meets with the whistleblower?
c. Who is privy to the whistleblowing information? Why are some people
omitted?
d. More likely to occur in the collegiate ranks or professional levels?
(provide examples)
9. Walk me through a whistleblowing case that you have experienced?
a. If you have never experienced a whistleblowing case can you walk me
through one that you have first or secondhand knowledge of?
b. What was the final outcome of the whistleblowing case?
i. Did you agree with the outcome?
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c. Do you consider the outcome to be in line with your moral and ethical
character?
10. Based on your experience what are possible motives for someone to
whistleblow?
a. Do you think a potential whistleblower weighs the pros and cons before
deciding whether or not to whistleblow?
i. What considerations or barriers do you feel would sway a
potential whistleblower against blowing the whistle?
11. Do you feel players, coaches, and managers have different motives for reporting
or not reporting a violation? If yes, please explain the differences.
a. How would a player, coach, or manager be viewed within the
organization if they blew the whistle?
b. How would someone benefit from reporting a violation?
c. How would reporting a violation negatively impact the whistleblower?
12. Do you see whistleblowing as positive or negative? Please explain.
a. Do you consider whistleblowing an ethical or moral act? Please explain.
b. How would you describe your moral and ethical character?
i. Does your character always match your behavior? Please explain
why or why not?
ii. Have you ever compromised your ethical and moral values due to
your job? Have you been asked to?
13. Do you feel that someone’s organizational position dictates their motives?
a. Do you feel that whistleblowing behavior is altered by someone’s
affiliation with the university? How so?
14. How are whistleblowers publically portrayed to the media at large?
a. What is the internal perception of the whistleblower?
15. Would you reward a whistleblower? If so, how?
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HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL LETTER 
DIVISION OF RESEARCH 
Research Compliance and Biosafety 
750 Agronomy Road, Suite 2701  
1186 TAMU 
College Station, TX 77843-1186 
Tel. 979.458.1467 Fax. 979.862.3176 
http://rcb.tamu.edu 
DATE: March 09, 2015 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Matthew Walker TAMU - Health And Kinesiology - Center For Sport Management Research 
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Dr. James Fluckey  
Chair 
Institutional Review Board 
SUBJECT: Expedited Approval- Initial Review 
Study 
Number: IRB2014-0259D 
Title: Whistleblowing in Sport 
Approval 
Date: 03/09/2015 
Continuing 
Review Due: 02/01/2016
Expiration 
Date: 03/01/2016 
Documents 
Reviewed 
and 
Approved: 
  Title  Version Number  Version Date  Outcome 
  Participation Script  Version 1.0  01/15/2015  Approved 
  NCAA Violations Scenarios  Version 1.0  01/15/2015  Approved 
  Moral Motivation  Version 1.0  01/15/2015  Approved 
  Survey Questions  Version 1.0  01/15/2015  Approved 
  Whistleblowing Interview Protocol  Version 1.0  01/15/2015  Approved 
  NASSM - Dissertation Proposal  Version 1.0  08/06/2014  Approved 
  Whistleblowing Inquiry - Interview 
consent. 
 Version 1.1  01/15/2015  Approved 
  Testing Whistleblowing Intention in 
Sport 
 Version 1.1  01/15/2015  Approved 
Document of Consent: 
x Written consent in accordance with 45 CF 46.116/ 21 CFR 50.27 for Interviews 
x Waiver approved under 45 CFR 46.117 (c) 1 or 2/ 21 CFR 56.109 (c)1 for online 
survey only. 
This research project has been approved. As principal investigator, you assume the following responsibilities: 
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APPENDIX D 
Born in Easton, Andrew Goldsmith grew up with his two brothers in 
Pennsylvania. He received his Bachelor of the Science in Sport and Recreation 
Management from Temple University. Upon completing his degree he took a position 
with the Philadelphia Eagles working in Publication and Web Design. He later moved to 
Indiana, PA to further his education and graduated from Indiana University of 
Pennsylvania with his Master’s degree in Sport Science with a concentration in Sport 
Studies in 2007. He then moved to Brooklyn, NY where he took a position at Adelphi 
University as the Assistant Director of Fitness, Recreation, and Aquatics. In an effort to 
pursue a PhD in Sport Management, he moved to Mississippi (the University of 
Southern Mississippi), Florida (University of Florida), and Texas (Texas A&M 
University). He completed his PhD at Texas A&M University in 2015. He is, and always 
will be, a Philadelphian at heart.  
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